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Director’s Introduction to the 
UAPI Summit Special Issue
The University and Agency Partnership Initiative (UAPI) is a cornerstone element of the 
CHDS mission of serving as “the Nation’s Homeland Security Educator.” Its mission: facilitate 
educational collaboration among institutions and agencies to support development of 
academic programs that enable a professional workforce and promote critical thinking in 
homeland security. The Initiative’s primary outcome is a sustainable network of university 
partners delivering the highest quality academic experience for students in homeland 
security and related fields. Leveraging CHDS materials and expertise, UAPI provides support 
to partners launching homeland security programs, helps prevent redundancy in curriculum 
development, and encourages partners to improve and add to the curricula that already 
exists.
In addition, UAPI organizes national and regional events that enable cross-institutional 
information exchange and encourage practitioner engagement with the broad capabilities 
of academia. The 10th Anniversary Homeland Defense & Security Education Summit, held 
in March 2017 in partnership with the DHS Office of Policy and hosted by George Mason 
University, is the premier example of UAPI’s effort to connect people and ideas. The 
outstanding papers that comprise this special issue of Homeland Security Affairs represent 
a sample of the depth and purpose of research across the Homeland Security enterprise. 
Readers might find value in these essays on two levels: first, in the theses proposed and the 
quality of the papers themselves; as well, I hope that the sample research provided here will 
stimulate interest in further engaging the remarkable capabilities across our community. On 
behalf of UAPI and our partners, thank you, and enjoy this special issue!
Steve Recca, Director, University and Agency Partnership Initiative
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Notes from the Editor
For the 2017 UAPI Summit Special Issue, Homeland Security Affairs presents the best papers 
from the 2017 University and Agency Partnership Initiative (UAPI) Summit Conference. This 
issue also contains executive summaries from eleven other outstanding papers from the 
UAPI Summit. All of the papers submitted for presentation at the meeting were vetted by an 
academic jury, and then the five best papers were selected by the Homeland Security Affairs 
Editorial Committee.
In “Cyber Border Security—Defining and Defending a National Cyber-Border,“ Phillip Osborn 
explores the concept of a cyber-border and explains how it can be applied and defended in 
the field of cyber-security.
In “Applying an Organizational Framework to Examine Jihadi Organizations as an Industry,” 
Michael Logan, Gina Ligon, and Douglas Derrick apply an organizational and industrial 
psychology approach to ascertain how certain characteristics of terrorist groups affect their 
performance.
In “Incorporating Prioritization in Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Programs, 
“ Duane Verner, Frederic Petit, and Kibek Kim, present an algorithm-based approach for 
identifying the most critical nodes in a critical infrastructure system.
In “A Right-Brained Approach to Critical Infrastructure Protection Theory in Support 
of Strategy and Education: Deterrence, Networks, Resilience and ‘Anti-Fragility,’” Eric 
Taquechel and Ted Lewis build on their previous work in applying insights from network 
science, operations research, complexity theory, and cognitive psychology to create a better 
approach to measuring risk and leveraging deterrence in critical infrastructure protection.
In “The Roots of Community Resilience: A Comparative Analysis of Structural Change in 
Four Gulf Coast Hurricane Response Networks,” Thomas Haase, Gunes Ertan, and Louise 
Comfort examine whether investments in information technology influenced the structural 
development and evolution of four disaster operations networks that formed in response to 
hurricanes in Louisiana and Texas.
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Cyber Border Security –  
Defining and Defending a National 
Cyber Border
By Phillip Osborn
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 5 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Osborn,  Cyber Border Security  2
Abstract
Concerns stemming from the convergence of border and cyber security threats are nothing 
new to those involved in both disciplines. Criminals and foreign actors have been exploiting 
computers and cyber methods to circumvent physical border security for decades.  Today 
nearly every crime or homeland security threat that once required some physical nexus 
with the nation’s traditional borders (land, sea, and air) is being committed, or at least 
facilitated, by some cyber component. In many ways vulnerabilities in cyber security render 
some aspects of traditional border security irrelevant, or at the very least, much less secure. 
The article explores this convergence of traditional border and cyber security and proposes 
a policy that would seek to evolve the concept of border security to include the cyber 
domain.  Based on policy work begun over a decade ago by the author while the national 
cybercrime program manager for the U.S. Customs Service, the article details how a national 
cyber border can be defined and enforced. Relying on a methodology that adapts existing 
authorities, the article provides logical justifications and arguments for the need and legal 
authority to define a national cyber border.  The strengths and shortcomings of this adaptive 
methodology are explored along with issues which may require new legislation. The article 
addresses some of the privacy concerns which are certain to arise from the cyber border 
concept using the same adaptive methodology of existing protections and expectations of 
privacy. The ultimate goal of the article is to stimulate  thought- provoking discussion and 
spur further academic research into the convergence of cyber and border security; issues 
which are interdependent and clearly  in the forefront of homeland and national security.
Suggested Citation
Osborn, Phillip. “Cyber Border Security – Defining and Defending a National Cyber Border.” 
Homeland Security Affairs 13, Article 5 (October 2017).  https://www.hsaj.org/articles/14093
Introduction
While the protection and control of our national borders has always been an important issue, 
the emergence of terrorist threats over the past several decades has brought concerns over 
border security to the forefront of national and homeland security discourse.  A major topic 
in the 2016 presidential election contest, increasing border security became the central 
theme of the eventual victor and perhaps a strong indicator of the importance of the issue to 
a large portion of the electorate.  Another less traditional security concern, but one that has 
rung alarms around the world, is the issue of cyber threats.  Because of their asymmetrical 
nature and potential severity, cyber threats have become an overarching subject to national 
and homeland security interests. This document asserts that the two-- border threats 
and cyber threats-- are not mutually exclusive, and it explores the convergence of border 
and cyber security. Further, this article will show that the evolution of the concept of the 
border beyond the traditional land, sea, and air frontiers of the nation to include the cyber 
border is both inevitable and necessary.  The article outlines the justification and conceptual 
framework for defining a national cyber border based on historical and traditional border 
analogies, and will discuss the existing legal framework that  makes defining a national cyber 
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border possible, along with the authorities for protecting it. The purpose of this discussion 
is to introduce what at first may seem an exotic concept, and then to bring greater clarity 
and understanding of the subject to the researcher or homeland security professional. The 
article primarily focuses on defining the legal justifications for enforcing a national cyber 
border through the adaptation and interpretation of current and traditional U.S. border 
enforcement authorities. It leaves much of the “how” of policing it to the further academic 
and legal research that it hopes to stimulate. The following analogy is offered as food-for-
thought regarding the cyber border and the debate for which this document hopes to be 
the catalyst.  For hundreds of years, the distance of a cannonball shot was used to measure 
how far from shore a country should extend its legal control and territorial claims.1 Leaders 
arrived at this distance based on the best technology of their day-- a cannon shot. This 
distance has changed and evolved over the years as newer technology made this original 
metric obsolete. We owe the founders of our country and the people of the nation our best 
attempt at interpreting the technologies of our day to develop policies and strategies to 
address the dynamic ways that cyberspace is changing the world and impacting national 
security.
The Convergence of Cyber and Border
What is border security and why is it so important? Simply put, the border is the point 
where foreign threats become domestic realities.  The right and duty of government, is to 
control who and what crosses the nation’s borders to protect the country and its people 
from foreign threats. The threats range from the obvious such as terrorists or criminals 
seeking to perpetrate an attack or commit a crime, to the less obvious such as contaminated 
agricultural and food products which could severely impact the nation’s farming industry 
or sicken the populous. Because protection of the nation is such a compelling interest, 
border security is clearly viewed as a primary responsibility of the state. The traditional 
border security efforts of the government are obvious.  Customs and Border Protection 
officers, Border Patrol Agents, and Coast Guard cutters are all physical measures employed 
to control the movement of persons and material entering, and in some cases exiting the 
country. These measures are a series of physical deterrents and inspection capabilities 
at the nation’s boundaries to identify and control who and what is allowed to cross the 
border. The emergence of cyber threats however has radically changed the border security 
landscape forever. 
The Internet and cyber methods provide an opportunity to circumvent traditional border 
security measures to perpetrate crimes and to harm the nation to a degree once only 
possible through large scale military actions. Terrorists, criminals, and nation states can 
and do take advantage of the asymmetrical nature of cyber methods to threaten and harm 
the nation and its people. Attacks on critical national infrastructure, the theft of sensitive 
government and industry trade secrets, the importation of hazardous and illegal materials, 
and the stealing of funds from banks and citizens are just a few of the crimes and threats 
that once normally required some physical compromise of traditional border security 
and controls to perpetrate. All of these actions are now possible by the illicit use of the 
Internet.  Some crimes commonly committed against individuals by foreign actors today, like 
the theft of personal information or finances, would have been impossible or improbable 
before the advent of the new “cyber vector” of attack.  Today cyber threats have converged 
with traditional border security threats and now either complement them, or provide new 
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opportunities to threaten the nation. By providing an avenue to circumvent physical border 
security measures, cyber methods have made many traditional border security efforts 
obsolete.
The Need to Define the Nation’s Cyber 
Border
With cyber threats being such an obvious danger, one would assume that the government 
would take a similar responsible role in protecting the nation from foreign intrusions and 
threats, however this is not the case. Unlike traditional border security, the government’s 
role in defending the nation from foreign cyber intrusion is far less robust. Rather than 
focusing on preventing the entry of cyber threats, the government functions in a response 
role, investigating after the fact and after an attack has occurred. Defense of the nation’s 
cyber frontier is largely left up to private entities, both persons and organizations, to protect 
their own cyber borders. From a border security perspective this is highly undesirable due 
to interdependency issues since each individual or organization’s computer or network 
once compromised can become an additional attack vector operating within the borders of 
our nation. This situation is analogous to making every individual responsible for their own 
physical border security, and ultimately that of the entire nation.  Imagine the government 
conceding responsibility for land border security to the private land owners living along the 
border with little more than recommended best practices and advice on protecting their 
portion of the border. Imagine the responsibility for food and drug safety being left up to the 
individual consumers or businesses importing these goods. While this may sound absurd, 
this is essentially the situation in the government’s approach to cyber threats.  
 One solution to the problem of foreign cyber threats is the evolution of the concept of 
the cyber border Once the concept of cyber border is defined, the government can use 
traditional laws and authorities to better protect the nation from current and future foreign 
cyber threats.
Borders in Cyberspace
An oft-repeated line is that in cyberspace there are no borders. This statement, while 
philosophically desirable among those seeking a more open world and society, is simply 
not true. There are physical borders that data transmission lines cross and there are 
functional equivalents of the border where data arrives directly from foreign places-- a very 
important concept that will be discussed further.  The concept of borders in cyberspace 
even permeates computer network phraseology where terms such as “border routers” and 
“demarcation lines” are used to express the boundaries between networks. Yes, there are 
borders in cyberspace, we have just chosen not to acknowledge the cyber border as we 
do the land, sea, and air borders.  Disruptive technologies which impact traditional border 
concepts are nothing new; the Internet is just the most recent. Air transport was another 
disruptive technology which required an evolution in traditional border security thinking 
and which provides an easy analogy to justify a similar evolution in the concept of the cyber 
border.
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Disruptive Technologies and Border 
Security
The advent of air travel could arguably be judged as equal to or exceeding the Internet in the 
disruptive impact it has had on the world. Like the Internet, it has opened up opportunities 
for commerce and contact between peoples that would otherwise not exist.  Like the 
Internet, air transport has also had a major impact on how war is waged, In terms of border 
security impact, air travel was also disruptive since there was no longer a traditional land 
or sea crossing at the countries’ boundaries. Aircraft could fly across the borders and land 
deep within the country. The response to this was not to surrender border security and 
authority over what and who was entering the country via aircraft, but an adaptation and 
evolution in the definition of the border which allowed the exercising of traditional border 
authorities. The definition of the cyber border requires a similar adaptation and evolution 
in border thinking.  
Defining the Cyber Border 
Many current legal rulings and decisions regarding the Internet and Cyberspace are based 
on the interpretation of existing laws that govern conventional non-cyber circumstances. In 
many cases this methodology has succeeded in finding a workable application of existing 
laws, while in others, attempts at such an application have been cumbersome. Viewed in this 
light, the governance of cyberspace and the Internet may ultimately require some radical 
departure from contemporary legal thinking, perhaps a new separate U.S. Code crafted 
specifically for it.  However, the legal framework to define the cyber border appears to be 
already present without any modifications or additions to existing laws.
Traditional Borders
The concept of traditional border— land, sea, or air—is relatively easy to grasp.  Land borders 
are the geographic boundary separating the adjacent territories of other countries.  The sea 
borders are a bit more complex and extend the physical border seaward from shore out to 
a specified distance. Currently this distance is 12 nautical miles seaward from the U.S. coast, 
increased from a 3 nautical distance which had been the distance claimed for many years. 
This claimed 12 mile zone is referred to as the territorial sea and is treated as the maritime 
border of the country. Additionally, the U.S. claims a further 12 mile nautical distance from 
the boundary of the territorial sea as Customs waters effectively allowing enforcement of 
customs and border controls seaward 24 nautical miles from the U.S. coast.  Further, the 
U.S. claims an additional 200 mile seaward zone to enforce an economic, exploratory and 
exploitation zone which evolved from a 200 mile fishery conservation zone.2 The variations 
and adjustments to border enforcement in the maritime realm are pragmatic and reflect the 
reality that time and technology necessitate changes and adaptations in order effectively 
to protect the nation. A similar adaptive view concerning enforcement of the air border 
discussed next, can also be used to define the cyber border. 
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The Air Border Analogy
The air borders are simply vertical extensions of the land and sea borders allowing control of 
the nation’s airspace. As an aircraft enters U.S. airspace it is very much crossing the nation’s 
border. Performing a Customs inspection of the aircraft, its passengers, and its cargo 
however would obviously be impractical at 35,000 feet. Where the aircraft lands therefore 
becomes what is referred to as the Functional Equivalent of the Border or FEB.  The FEB 
is the first practical point where border controls can be exercised on the aircraft.3  The 
clearest example of FEBs would be the foreign arrival areas of international airports where 
immigration and customs inspections of aircraft, passengers, and cargo are conducted well 
away from the actual physical border at its functional equivalent.  
Functional Equivalents of the Border
The concept of the Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB) is critical to border security 
because it allows the legal imposition of regulatory requirements (search, inspection, and 
seizure) away from the physical borders. In order to have an FEB, circumstances must exist 
which create the same environment as the border: those being: 1) there is a “nexus” to 
the border, a border crossing, or to something which has crossed the border; 2) there is 
a reasonable certainty that there has been no material change since the nexus with the 
border; and 3) the search and/or inspection occurs at the first practical detention point after 
the border crossing.4  It is this same type of interpretation of the FEB that makes defining the 
cyber border largely possible. 
The Cyber Border
The simplest method to define the cyber border is to apply the land border concept. The 
place where data transmission cables cross the physical national borders would constitute a 
border crossing.  This analogy is deficient, however, since data can cross the border via other 
means independent of terrestrial data transmission cables – via satellite for example. It is 
also impractical for border protection and inspection for the same reason inspection of an 
in-bound aircraft at 35,000 feet is impractical.  The cyber border therefore is best defined as 
the FEB where the data arrives at the first practical point of inspection— a network router, 
computer server, PC, or other networked device. 
 The web site example depicted in figure1 demonstrates the FEB concept applied to the cyber 
border. It depicts a World Wide Web (www) site involved in the sale of some type of illegal 
merchandise. This merchandise could be any item that would constitute an illegal import at 
the border such as controlled substances, counterfeit products, or child pornography.  In 
this example the web site is hosted on a server located in the U.S., but directly managed and 
controlled by a foreign located criminal.  
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
The website operator in Paris (1) logs into their web hosting account in Houston (2) and 
uploads merchandise (software, music, movies, etc.) that is advertised for sale and down-
load from their web site. The Houston web server becomes a Functional Equivalent of the 
Border (FEB).
Figure 1. Example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity
The illicit web site in the example above could be providing information on the merchandise 
for sale, how to place an order, how to pay for the merchandise, and the options to arrange 
delivery. In the case of Internet deliverable merchandise, the web site can also be the point 
where customers access and retrieve (download) the merchandise; alternately the customers 
could also be directed to a second web site or file server to download the merchandise. Still 
another option is it that the customer can receive the merchandise directly as an email 
attachment from the seller from either a foreign or domestic email server.  
Figures 2 and 3 depict more complex scenarios for an illicit web site that involves the 
interpretation of multiple FEBs involved in the ordering and receipt of illegal imports. 
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
4. Customer in Duluth (EB)
3. Email hosted in San Jose (FEB)
3. The website operator in Paris receives customer orders and sends invoices and down-
load instruction to customers via their email account hosted in San Jose which becomes a 
Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB).
4. A customer in Duluth sends an order for merchandise via email to the seller’s email 
account hosted in San Jose and receives the order invoice and the download instructions 
from the seller. The customer then downloads the merchandise from the seller’s website 
in Houston directly to the customer’s computer which becomes and Extended Border (EB).
Figure 2. Example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity with multiple FEBs
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1. Website Operator in Paris
2. Houston Web Server (FEB)
4. Customer in Duluth (FEB)
3. Email hosted in San Jose (FEB)
File Server in 3rd Country (Sweden)
4. Customer accesses seller’s le server in third country (in this example Sweden) and 
downloads the merchandise directly to their computer. The customer’s computer eec-
tively becomes a Functional Equivalent of the Border (FEB).
Figure 3. Another example of direct delivery of merchandise from a foreign entity with 
multiple FEBs
Critical to the understanding of how the FEB concept applies to defining the cyber border 
is an understanding of border enforcement authorities and how they work to protect the 
nation from border threats, while also addressing important constitutional and privacy 
concerns.
Border Search Authorities and Their 
Application to the Cyber Border
One of the most important border protection tools is the border search authority.  This 
long-standing  authority held by Customs officers and other authorized officials  dates from 
the time of the nation’s founding and is derived from some of the first statutes passed by 
Congress.5  Based on Congress’s broad authority to regulate foreign commerce and enforce 
immigrations laws, border search authority is a  long- established exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause and search warrant requirements. 6 
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The contemporary threat from terrorism and a basic interest in national self-protection 
make border search authority a necessary and legally accepted exception to normal 4th 
Amendment concerns. Border search authority allows for the warrant-less inbound and 
outbound search of persons, conveyances, and merchandise at the borders, the functional 
equivalent of the border, and in some other cases away from the border at what is referred 
to as the extended border.7 While traditional border searches focus on the inspection of 
people, conveyances, and merchandise, the focus of cyber border searches would focus on 
the import and export of digital merchandise.    
The primary purpose of a Customs border search is to inspect persons, baggage, and 
merchandise to ensure  that duties are collected and to ensure that whatever is entering 
or leaving the country is in compliance with U.S. law.8  Another important purpose of these 
searches is to search for and seize prohibited imported or exported merchandise. The 
definition of merchandise is  “goods, wares, and chattels of every description.”9  If there 
is any debate as to whether the data carried over the Internet is merchandise it would 
come as a surprise to the thousands of copyright owners and vendors of software, music, 
movies, and books which are delivered to millions of customers daily via the Internet, or to 
the customers who pay for this digital merchandise. The debate on whether digital data is 
imported or exported in the traditional sense can be argued as being a function of the origin 
and ultimate arrival country of the digital merchandise.  The illegal material or contraband 
which can be and is imported and exported via the Internet runs the gamut from child 
pornography, to counterfeit or illegally copied software and music, to stolen credit card 
information, to seditious materials— all materials which would be subject to seizure as 
imports or exports contrary to law.10   
Of special importance to the cyber border discussion, particularly in the area of border 
inspection, is the inclusion of documents within the purview of a border search.11   As stated 
previously, web sites advertising the sale of some type of merchandise can be simply that, 
an advertisement for a product, which provides a channel for the customer to contact and 
arrange the purchase and delivery of the merchandise. These contacts and arrangements 
can be accomplished through a variety of avenues including via email, web messages, 
or via an advertised telephone number on the web site. In the case of a web site being 
controlled by a foreign source, the email associated with the web page will likely contain 
information relating to the orders for these products and services and should be considered 
as documents relating to the importation of the merchandise.  In the illustration examples, 
the emailed documents pertaining to orders from customers, whether those customers are 
located in the U.S. or elsewhere, are retrieved by the foreign source from a domestically 
located U.S. email or web server and transferred/exported to their foreign source’s location. 
Conversely, documents relating to the orders sent from the foreign source to customers 
in the U.S. are sent from the foreign source’s computer and are imported to their email 
server located in the U.S.  In a traditional border search scenario, documents arriving from a 
foreign source, whether carried on a person, in baggage, or accompanying the merchandise, 
would be subject to search and examination to see if they pertained to the importation of 
goods. These same documents arriving via the Internet are not subject to this same search. 
A domestically hosted but foreign-manipulated web site can not only serve as simply an 
advertising and ordering mechanism for merchandise that is shipped via traditional parcel 
service or mail, but can also serve as the actual delivery vehicle for the merchandise. Web 
sites that offer digital merchandise such as software, music, and videos commonly store the 
merchandise in separate file directories on the web host computers that the customers pay 
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to access. In such cases it is reasonable to assume that the digital merchandise placed in 
these file directories by the foreign source was imported to those computers by the foreign 
source from their foreign location. In most cases this can be verified by inspecting the IP 
history logs maintained by the web hosting company. The digital merchandise located on a 
domestic web hosting company computer/server that has been imported to that computer/
server by a foreign web site operator should be subject to a Customs border search as an 
FEB.
Legal Merchandise versus Prohibited 
Merchandise
The Internet border search issue goes well beyond just the concern of illegal imports and 
contraband, but also to the much wider subject of general merchandise being imported 
via or assisted by the Internet. The exponential growth of Internet e-commerce represents 
legitimate commerce by both individual consumers and corporations. Internet border search 
authority may eventually be required to fulfill the other Customs missions of protecting the 
nation’s revenues and for the proper assessment of duties.  While the immediate impact that 
the addition of Internet/cyber border authorities would be most evident in the suppression 
of smuggling and other illegal activities, the benefit to the overall revenue protection may 
eventually prove just as significant. 
Merchandise versus Communications
Current border search authority allows authorized officials to search for imported or 
exported merchandise including documents, at the border or its functional equivalent. 
This discussion of redefining the border for the purposes of enforcing a cyber border is not 
directed at private communications unless those communications pertain to an importation 
or exportation of merchandise— legal or otherwise. 
Privacy Issues and Concerns
The cyber environment should not enjoy any enhanced protections over what persons 
should rightfully expect in the traditional physical world.  Therefore, privacy issues involving 
the cyber border should be of no greater concern than in a traditional border situation. 
Since the focus of cyber border enforcement is on merchandise (legal and illegal, entering 
or exiting via the cyber border), private or privileged communications are already protected 
from inspection the same as in non-border situations.12  Only data containing merchandise 
or documents relating the import/export of merchandise, legal and illegal, would be subject 
to inspection and border search and seizure. Granted, the cyber world does present some 
issues which may not have a corollary in the non-cyber world, but just as the evolved view 
of the traditional border must be adapted, so must the interpretation of border authorities 
so they may evolve  to address the uniqueness of the cyber environment.
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Conclusion
The importance of defending the nation against cyber threats is critical to national and 
homeland security. The magnitude of current and emerging cyber threats is equal to and 
may in actuality surpass traditional threats. The asymmetrical nature of cyber provides to 
minor nation-state enemies and even lone wolf actors the ability to inflict great harm to a 
great military power like the United States.  Criminals do and will continue to exploit cyber 
to their advantage rendering many aspects of traditional crime prevention ineffective or 
obsolete.  Stopping and preventing foreign threats at the border has been and always will be 
a key element in protecting the nation and its people. Adapting and evolving our definition of 
the border to define a national cyber border will help deny this pathway for foreign threats 
into our country.
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Abstract
The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, funded by 
The Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University 
Programs (DHS S&T OUP) since 2010, uses an industrial and organizational psychology approach 
to assess the characteristics of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in relation to their capacity 
for innovative and violent performance. In the current paper, we use the LEADIR database and an 
internal strategic organizational approach to assess the unique set of resources and capabilities that 
provide a competitive advantage within the “Jihad Industry.” The results suggest that VEOs ability 
to utilize or acquire one or more unique resources or capabilities provides a competitive advantage 
over other groups in the larger Jihadi Industry. We will discuss practical implications for DHS I&A, as 
well as the methodological contributions of using a lens from management theory and organizational 
psychology to the scholarship on violent extremism. 
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Introduction
While the amount of research on violent extremism has increased since the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, only a handful of studies have delved into the complexities of violent 
extremist organizations.1 Broadly speaking, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) are 
coordinated efforts among individuals that share a similar ideological framework and employ 
violence as a means toward a collective goal.2 In terms of their sophistication, VEOs can range 
from relatively simple (e.g., Animal Liberation Front) to highly complex organizations (e.g., 
Da’esh). Regardless, VEOs are marked by a shared ideology as well as common organizational 
goals that are necessary for the group’s survival such as recruitment, fundraising, training, 
and disseminating information. 
In the current paper, we use models from industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology and 
management to examine ten VEOs with a foothold in the “Jihadi Industry.” More specifically, 
we use the Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) 
project to gain insight and differentiate VEOs relative to their peer organizations in terms 
of capability, resilience, and attractiveness. We performed a Value, Rareness, Imitability, 
Organization (VRIO) analysis3 to assess each VEO’s unique set of strategic resources (e.g., 
cyber infrastructure) and capabilities (e.g., tactical innovation) that provide a competitive 
advantage among their industry peers. 
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The results of our analysis offer general and operational-level implications. More specifically, 
at a general-level, this study highlights:
1. The robust nature of using an organizational approach to examine and differentiate 
VEOs. In particular, this approach may prove useful for agencies in identifying high versus 
low risk threats, and allocating resources to combat those threats. 
2. A novel approach to gather, quantify, and compare the cyber capabilities of VEOs. 
While prior research on VEOs’ use of cyber has focused solely on descriptions of use of 
publicly-available social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, YouTube) or encrypted forums, 
our contribution is that we systematically analyzed what cyber innovation means in the 
Jihadi Industry by assessing the underlying behaviors facilitated by their use of an array 
of platforms and web-based features. 
Next, at the operational level our analysis suggests: 
1. Da’esh leads the Jihadi Industry on all performance metrics, but they have been 
significantly degraded since 2014. Examining their cyber presence, our data shows less 
collaboration across domains and fewer durable cyber objects produced since the end 
of 2015. Thus, using organizational metrics such as collaboration in both physical and 
cyber space can provide CT professionals with a unique metric for the effectiveness of 
capturing digital terrain and degrading the organization. 
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) (formerly al-
Nusra Front) are only second to Da’esh in terms of organizational legitimacy efforts, 
leadership and human capital, and fundraising. Similar to Da’esh, AQAP’s long-term tenure 
within a turbulent environment (e.g., Yemen) has created an efficient, legitimate, and 
sophisticated organization profile. Likewise, JFS has effectively played on the grievances 
of the Sunni populace by branding themselves as a viable group that is different from Al 
Qaeda Central. The method of examining organizational capacity can provide an early 
warning indicator of growing strength for emerging threats.
3. Despite over a decade of international pressure, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) continues to operate 
with impunity in Pakistan. In turn, LeT is one of the most effective VEOs at fundraising 
in the Jihadi Industry. Fundraising as a sustained advantage for LeT is concerning and 
should be closely monitored given the establishment of al Qaeda’s new affiliate in the 
Indian Subcontinent.
4. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and, to a slightly lesser extent, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) performed poorly across most indices in our analysis. In-fighting between high-
ranking members of each organization as well as successful counter-terrorism operations 
have diminished the capacity of each group. ASG and AQIM are the least likely to acquire 
the resources to sustain a competitive advantage compared to the other organizations 
in this analysis. 
In the following section, we provide an overview of the methodology used for this study as 
well as a more in-depth discussion of our findings. 
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Methodology 
This project employed a historiometric methodology in order to evaluate the strategic and 
comparative threat posed by VEOs within the Jihadi Industry. Following best practices4, we 
defined the sample that would provide the best comparative attributes to evaluate some of the 
most prominent VEOs within the larger framework of high threat VEOs. After identifying the 
sample, we gathered data from primary and secondary sources, evaluated the organizations 
in our sample using the LEADIR content coding scheme and indices of technical capabilities 
and sophistication.5 Finally, we conducted analyses to identify organizational attributes and 
resources that differentiate certain VEOs and their competition in the Jihadi Industry. Figure 
1 provides a visual representation of the methods used for this study.
Figure 1. Overview of Methods
Data Collection and Procedure 
We partnered with three government-civilian subject matter experts (SMEs) familiar with 
the Jihadi Industry to select key VEOs whose ideology is centered on Salafist conceptions 
of Jihad. Specifically, we focused on Da’esh and its affiliates as well as affiliates of al Qaeda 
Central (AQC). Given that Da’esh was formerly an affiliate of AQC, this was considered the 
most appropriate sample for comparison, because by virtue of forming those alliances (with 
the exception, perhaps, of AQAP), the ideology, tactical operations, and targeting preferences 
of the affiliates were shaped by AQC. Table 1 highlights the ten VEOs being examined.  
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Table 1. Sample of Ten VEOs 
VEO Primary Area(s) of Operation
1) Da’esh Iraq, Syria
2) Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) Iraq, Syria
3) al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Algeria, Mali
4) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Yemen
5) al-Shabaab Somalia
6) Boko Haram Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad
7) Afghan Taliban Afghanistan, Pakistan
8)    Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) Pakistan, Afghanistan
9) Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Pakistan
10) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Philippines, Indonesia
Organizational and Leadership Data 
To gather information about these organizations, secondary data were gathered from 
academic and government sources (e.g., profiles and data from the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Southern Poverty Law Center, 
Mapping Militant Organizations by Martha Crenshaw) as well as scholarly case studies and 
public-records databases (e.g., Lexis-Nexis). In some cases, we triangulated these secondary 
sources by using source-verified primary documents from the organizations themselves, 
such as manuals, propaganda, videos, and websites run by the organizations to cross-
reference information found in archival, analyst reports (e.g., START resources). 
Since one of our main research objectives for this paper was to identify key areas where VEOs 
in our sample differ, we used a psychometric approach to scale development and criterion 
from previous LEADIR projects6 to code and classify the organizational-level data. For each 
category of variables (i.e., organizational characteristics, performance-related constructs, 
and controls), operational definitions with readily identifiable benchmark examples were 
used, employing psychometric best practices used to evaluate other types of heterogeneous 
organizations
Attack and Cyber Data
The attack-level data in this study were drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
Rather than simply assessing lethality as an indicator of performance, we performed a 
stratified random sample of each VEO’s attacks as reported by the GTD and applied an 
innovative coding scheme to each one7. In total, 27 rating scales were applied to 1,441 attacks 
across the ten VEOs in our sample. 
To assess cyber sophistication and expertise, we collected and analyzed web material 
associated with each VEO. The data was collected through a combination of “key word” 
searches and the utilization of an automated web crawler. After collection, the cyber data 
were evaluated by technical SMEs to determine the sophistication of the resources and 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 6 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Logan, Ligon, & Derrick,  Jihadi Organizations as an Industry  6
expertise that would be required to produce them. For example, webpages that had multiple 
indices of encryption capabilities were evaluated as more sophisticated than those with 
fewer security parameters deployed. 
Analytic Strategy: VRIO Analysis 
To compare the ten Jihadi Industry VEOs, we used a VRIO analytic technique, or a technique 
that evaluates the likelihood that an organization will obtain a sustainable advantage based 
on its resources.8 Competitive advantage references an organization’s ability to create more 
value than its rivals, and requires SMEs to assess each VEO’s resources on 1) their value, b) 
rarity, c) inimitability, and d) the degree the other resources in an organization are organized 
effectively to take full advantage of that advantage. Organizations possessing only valuable 
resources and capabilities are expected to perform the same as all other organizations 
in the industry (i.e., competitive parity). Organizations possessing valuable and rare 
resources and capabilities are expected to perform better than other organizations but 
only for a short period of time (i.e., temporary competitive advantage), while organizations 
possessing valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable resources and capabilities are expected 
to demonstrate a long-term advantage (i.e., sustained competitive advantage). Imperfect 
imitability of a resource or capability was determined by the presence of one or more of the 
following attributes. 
1. History – The focal resource or capability was acquired at a particular place and time 
in the past. Competing organizations are unable to imitate that resource or capability 
because they are operating in a different place and time (e.g., senior military leadership 
of ISIL who came from Saddam Hussein’s regime). 
2. Causal ambiguity – Competing organizations are unable to imitate the focal resource or 
capability because of its complexity, tacit, and/or intangible attributes (e.g., social media 
and cyber sophistication).
3. Social complexity – Competing organizations are unable to replicate the focal resource 
or capability due to its presence within a sectarian conflict that has its own magnetism 
(e.g., public discontent with the Assad regime).
The overall organization (i.e., its structure) must also be aligned in such a way as to 
take advantage of the resources or capabilities in question. If misaligned, competitive 
disadvantages may emerge even though resources and capabilities are valuable, rare and 
difficult to imitate. VRIO analyses evaluate the likelihood that an organization will obtain a 
sustainable advantage in a given competitive arena. Sustainable competitive advantages 
are assumed to originate from the resources and capabilities controlled by the organization. 
Strategically Differentiating Resources
Resources represent the tangible and intangible assets controlled by the organization. 
Resources can be financial (e.g., cash), physical (e.g., equipment, natural resources), 
human (e.g., knowledge, intelligence, training, creativity) and organizational (e.g., reporting 
structure, culture, planning and control mechanisms). For the present effort—building upon 
the findings from our 2014 report on the VRIO of Da’esh compared to its competitors—we 
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assessed each of the ten VEOs in our Jihad Industry sample on six resources: (1) Marketing 
and Branding, (2) Recruiting and Human Capital, (3) Fundraising, (4) Tactical Innovation, (5) 
Cyber Sophistication, and (6) Cyber Interactivity. The subsequent sections provide more 
justification and detail into each VEO’s differentiators. Figure 2 shows the overall findings 
from our VRIO analysis. In the following sections, we describe the subsections of the VRIO 







Figure 2. VRIO of Ten VEOs
Marketing and Branding
An organization’s brand can be described as its personality.  Like individuals and other firms, 
each VEO has a unique personality that is shaped by the VEO itself and the consumers of 
its products.  A branding and marketing strategy can be understood as complementary 
components to an organization’s outreach. The brand is the representation and staple of 
the organization, while marketing is comprised of the behaviors the organization undertakes 
to sell its brand.  In other words, marketing behavior is how an organization sells its brand 
or its personality.  VEOs, like other organizations, put forth effort to establish themselves 
as a unique brand within the terrorism field and therefore engage in similar strategies like 
traditional firms, such as the production of media favoring the brand.  
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For this analysis, we used two measures of reputation and prominence to gauge the 
effectiveness of the marketing and branding of the ten VEOs. An organization’s brand is 
largely built in the relative reputation or status that organization has.  This status can be 
understood as how popular or well-known a certain organization is within its industry.  In 
our analysis, this industry would be the “Jihad Industry.”  Therefore, we used cultural and 
comparative reputation to measure the degree to which each VEO compares in status against 
other organizations within the industry.  Prominence is a multiplicative index measuring 
both the level of co-branding and external legitimacy of an organization. The degree to 
which an organization allies or “co-brands” with another brand increases the performance 
and prominence of the organization and influences the relative understanding of the brand. 
For example, co-branding allows for two organizations to make use of the brand of the allied 
organization to further increase the prominence of its own brand and add to the relative 
performance of the other brand.  This co-branding often leads to an increase in customers 
and resources because both brands can make use of the resources of the other brands. 
Meanwhile legitimacy is a measure of the degree to which an organization follows the rules 
of industry and is an indication of how the group is regarded as a “professional” within its 
field.  
Table 2. Comparative VRIO rating
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High AQAP
AQAP’s Inspire magazine is one of the flagship 
English-language jihadi publications and is one 
of many propaganda magazines AQAP publishes. 
These publications are not only used to recruit, 
but also shape potential sympathizers and 
supporter’s attitudes and perceptions of the 
group. 
Low Abu Sayyaf Group
In 2014, one of Abu Sayyaf Group’s core leaders 
pledged allegiance to Da’esh. Despite this oath 
of allegiance, no credible link between the two 
groups has been found. Given the decline of 
Jemaah Islamiyah and their weakened relationship 
with al Qaeda Central, ASG lacks a clear linkage to 
the most prominent organizations in the current 
Jihadi Industry. 
Human Capital and Recruitment
Like most organizations faced with increasing competition and growing external pressures, 
VEOs have realized that they too must evolve to meet emerging challenges. The current 
iteration of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) such as Da’esh, Al-Shabaab, and AQAP 
have been particularly successful at perpetrating violence and spreading fear through 
innovative means such as the utilization of social media and web-based platforms. The 
sampled VEOs are adept at building their ranks through a combination of both time-tested 
and increasingly novel personnel attraction and selection mechanisms. The importance 
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of knowledge about social, personal and economic factors for recruitment, as discussed 
above, is reinforced by research both on the nature of VEO propaganda. Zelin9 analyzed 
Da’esh social media output and identified that alongside promoting their military-related 
activities, the group highlighted their social services as well as “the great life one can live 
under the Caliphate, especially by foreign fighters.” Other VEO media seek to show their 
familiarity with western culture to attract western members; for example, posting pictures 
of fighters with Nutella jars.10  Da’esh spends significant energy presenting the view that 
they are active and on the march. Moreover, when communicating to potential recruits from 
the West, Da’esh has images that showcase both their military prowess and highlight their 
organizational legitimacy as well as couch pragmatic advice about travel and operations 
in ideological imperatives. This mix of pragmatic advice, ideology, and organizational 
legitimacy creates a powerful brand to influence potential recruits.11  In LEADIR, we assess 
the techniques VEOs use to increase their human capital. Following from how recruitment is 
assessed in conventional organizations, we rate each VEO’s tactics in terms of their novelty 
(degree of surprise or uniqueness in a given region and time), diversity (number of different 
types of techniques), and overall effectiveness (degree to which the recruiting strategies 
yield a viable pool of skilled members). 
Table 3: Comparative VRIO rating12
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High Da’esh
Until recently, Da’esh has been able to recruit an array 
of specialized recruits to the caliphate. Da’esh success 
in recruitment is largely due to their novel use of social 
media and other peer-to-peer cyber technologies. 
Low AQIM
AQIM primary targets low-skilled recruits through their 
regionally-focused, anti-colonialism propaganda. Despite 
operating their own media-wing, Al-Andalus Media, AQIM 
is said to lack the sophistication to recruit globally, outside 
of the Sahara and Sahel region of Northern Africa. 
Fundraising
While it is difficult to assess the true wealth of any clandestine organization, LEADIR does 
have data to speak to the novelty of fundraising mechanisms used by a given VEO. Our 
benchmark scales require raters to compare VEOs based on low novelty fundraising tactics 
(e.g., membership dues) versus high novelty fundraising tactics (e.g., looting artifacts from 
the ancient city of Palmyra and selling them). For the present effort, we compared each 
VEO in our sample longitudinally to assess changes in the creativity of tactics to secure 
resources. Before turning to these results, however, we would like to point out two additional 
findings concerning fundraising. First, the relationship between novelty in fundraising and 
an organization’s age tended to be inverse, which is to say that the longer the organization 
has been together, the less innovative their approach. The relationship is not linear, 
however, and organizations that have been together for approximately fifteen years are 
more innovative than those who have been together for ten years, but are less innovative 
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than those which  are relatively new (less than ten years). Second, the relationship between 
destructive fundraising tactics per monetary unit and an organization’s age approximates a 
U-curve, indicating that the newest groups tend to have moderately destructive fundraising 
techniques. The oldest groups largely employed non-destructive fundraising tactics, while 
those that have been together for roughly fifteen years employed the most destructive 
fundraising tactics. 
Table 4: Comparative VRIO rating
Performance on 
VRIO Analysis VEO Illustrative Example
High LeT
LeT relies very little on coercive or illegal methods to 
secure funds. Instead, LeT has established a stable 
infrastructure through an expansive network of private 
and public donors and charitable organizations.
Low TTP
TTP relies heavily on illegal activities to secure funds 
(e.g., drug trade, kidnapping, bank robberies). These 
funding streams may provide short-term success, but do 
not provide a long-term, sustainable funding solution.
Tactical Innovation
Organizations within the Jihadi Industry operate in a turbulent environment with immense 
competition over human capital, which is drawn to a Salafist Jihad ideology. In order to survive, 
VEOs must work toward creative goals and, more importantly, develop innovative ways to 
thrive in an unpredictable market. Tactical innovation or the extent to which VEOs “adopt 
news methods or means of violence13” provides one indicator of creativity and innovation. To 
illustrate VEOs capacity for tactical innovation, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
on the attack-level variables in our sample. A total of 1,441 attacks were coded yearly for each 
VEO in our sample and variables were explored using a principal component analysis (PCA) 
with varimax rotation. The PCA resulted in eight items loading on two different constructs. 
The first factor included three items pertaining to markers of originality and expertise. This 
factor was named Unique Proficiency and describes attacks that require expertise and are 
unique in terms of the weapons used and methods employed. The second factor included 
five items pertaining to complexity and physical infrastructural damage. This factor was 
named Attack Sophistication and is characterized by highly coordinated, well-executed 
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attacks that often cause major infrastructural damage. The two factors were moderately 
correlated (r = .359, p < .01).
Table 5. Average Tactical Innovation Scores (n=1,441)
VEO Unique Proficiency Attack Sophistication
Afghani Taliban 5.87 9.39




Abu Sayaaf Group 5.17 7.75




1) Unique Proficiency ranges from 3-13; Attack Sophistication ranges from 5-20.
2) Higher scores on both constructs indicate stronger performance.
Each VEO’s average Unique Proficiency and Attack Sophistication scores were used to guide the 
VRIO analysis and act as a descriptive indicator of each organization’s capacity for tactical 
innovation. Above, Table 2 shows that there was relative consistency in each organization 
score across both measures. For example, Da’esh, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, AQIM, and AQAP 
scored in the upper half on both Unique Proficiency and Attack Sophistication, while the Afghan 
Taliban, LeT, TTP, and Abu Sayyaf Group scored in the bottom half. Two groups, Al-Shabaab 
and Boko Haram, were less consistent, scoring highly on one construct, but not the other. 
Al-Shabaab rated second only to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Unique Proficiency, yet scored in 
the bottom half on Attack Sophistication. Boko Haram had the third highest average Attack 
Sophistication rating, but scored poorly on Unique Proficiency.
Cyber Sophistication and Interactivity
Because the examination of cyber profiles of VEOs is relatively new, we first provide an 
overview of how the VEOs in our sample use cyber resources to execute organizational 
functions such as marketing, recruiting, fundraising, and attack planning. VEOs leverage 
domains with low barriers and low authentication in order to host the content in the open as 
long as possible. There are several different patterns considering page and content posting 
and attributes. Page attributes fall under one of three distinct aspects; those who view 
pages for the group membership or loyalty; up- and down- loading of content; or content 
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engagement. This is confirmed by the results of an exploratory factor analysis of the web 
content we harvested with varimax rotation. Nine items obtained loading scores of .80 or 
higher across two different constructs. The four items loading on the first factor pertained 
to markers of complexity and the variety of features employed. This factor was named 
Sophistication and designates increasing technological skills and instantiations employed in 
message and content delivery by VEOs online. The five items loading on the second factor 
largely pertained to the facilitation of (social) ties between actors in the network. This factor 
was named Social Interactivity and is interactivity between actors in the social graph, including 
two types of direct message exchanges. The two factors were moderately correlated (r = .46, 
p < .01).14 
Table 6. Cyber Sophistication and Social Interactivity Scores
VEO Sophistication Social Interactivity
Afghani Taliban .30 .32




Abu Sayaaf Group 3.43 2.20




1) Higher scores on both constructs indicate stronger performance.
2) No transient webpages were found for LeT.
To assess each VEO on these factors, we obtained scores on each factor across their cyber 
objects. Table 3 indicates that while Da’esh is the most sophisticated and holds the most 
capability for social interactivity, AQAP is a close second on all metrics. In addition, while Boko 
Haram scored high on social media interactivity, it appears that they leverage existing open 
architecture in predictable ways. Thus, they may not have the cyber capability to program 
or innovate similarly to Da’esh, AQAP, or al-Shabaab. Interestingly LeT and Taliban have 
the lowest cyber capabilities. The main contribution from this analysis is that our process 
for assessing differences in the innovation and social media interactivity of these 10 VEOs 
allowed us to array the Jihadi Industry VEOs in the present sample. This has implications for 
their capacity to recruit and share their messaging, raise funds, and execute command and 
control.
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Conclusions and Implications
The paper’s main findings indicate that leadership, organizational structure, and innovation 
vary across the Jihadi Industry, which has implications for how government resources should 
be allocated for monitoring and analysis. In addition, the findings highlight the need for 
additional research to determine advanced indicator and warning signals of which groups 
will emerge as the most strategically differentiated and capable of malevolent innovation in 
coming years. 
First, Da’esh leads the Jihadi Industry on all performance metrics, but they have been 
significantly degraded since 2014. Across leadership, organizational structure, marketing, 
attacks, and cyber capabilities, Da’esh outperformed each VEO in the present sample of 
the Jihadi Industry. However, since our last assessment of their human capital in 2014, the 
quality of leader talent and innovation of attack sophistication have diminished. 
Second, we developed a method to gather, quantify, and compare VEO cyber sophistication 
and social media interactivity, and this custom method statistically differentiated the ten 
VEOs in our sample. Most of the research to date on VEOs’ use of cyber has focused solely 
on descriptions of use of publicly-available social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, YouTube) or 
encrypted forums. Our contribution is that we systematically analyzed what cyber innovation 
means in the Jihadi Industry by assessing the underlying behaviors facilitated by their use of 
an array of platforms and web-based features. 
Finally, conflict between top management team members are related to lower organizational 
capabilities and less innovation. The clearest example of this in our dataset is that of the 
Afghan Taliban, who should be poised for high levels of performance given their strategic 
location, third party endorsement by al-Qaida Central leaders, and organizational age. 
Despite these resources, infighting among leaders and lack of clear leadership mission has 
resulted in a less capable organization. Conversely, organizations such as Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham and Da’esh gain strength under the stewardship of a mix of pragmatic and ideological 
leaders working collaboratively toward organizational goals.  
These findings lead to the recommendations flowing from the present effort. First, monitor 
AQAP’s rebrand efforts in Yemen, as well as outreach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters abroad. 
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been the most capable AQ branch, and its 
marketing efforts indicate a pivot to focus on the social services it provides as well as the 
resilience of its organizational structure despite leader losses. Given the nexus of the state-
sponsored groups, failed/ fragile state markers, and crime-laden territory of Yemen, this 
group is poised for a re-emergence by all indicators. In addition, the high degree of social 
interactivity on various AQAP cyber platforms raises warnings for their potential outreach to 
those capable of executing a large-scale, sophisticated attack outside their territory. 
Finally, focus strategic communication efforts and operational planning to denigrate VEO 
leadership. Success from efforts to degrade the Da’esh organization should highlight at least 
one practice to continue and increase: leadership targeting. While leadership targeting has 
mixed results, VEOs in our sample with the strongest cadre of leaders and a collaborative 
leadership team also have the most sophisticated attacks, cyber presence, and fundraising 
portfolio. Rather than focusing on the capacity of any one individual in a leadership position, 
it’s critical that policy makers focus strategic communications and planning on disrupting 
the organizational dynamics afforded by an adversary’s diverse and collaborative leadership 
team. 
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Abstract
Protecting critical infrastructure, especially in a complex urban area or region, should focus 
on identifying and prioritizing potential failure points that would have the most severe 
consequences. Such prioritization can inform targeted planning and investment decisions, 
such as what infrastructure should be hardened or relocated first or what infrastructure 
should receive priority restoration following a disaster, among other uses. Without a 
prioritization process, assessment and protection programs are typically guided by 
intuition or expert judgement, and they often do not consider system-level resilience. While 
understanding how to prioritize high-consequence failure points for assessments and, for 
protection is essential, the complexity of infrastructure systems can quickly overwhelm. For 
example, in a notional region with 1,000 electric power assets, almost one million failure 
scenarios are associated with an N-2 contingency and nearly one billion failure scenarios 
are associated with an N-3 contingency. As a result, it is simply not feasible technically 
nor financially for system operators and government agencies to assess and prepare for 
all possible disruptions. Therefore, a primary goal of critical infrastructure protection and 
resilience programs should be to identify and prioritize the most critical contingencies 
affecting infrastructure systems. Achieving this goal will allow decision makers to identify 
high-impact isolated failures as well as cascading events, and to prioritize protection 
investments and restoration planning accordingly. To solve this problem, Argonne National 
Laboratory developed an optimization framework capable of modeling and prioritizing 
high-consequence failure points across critical infrastructure systems. The optimization 
framework can model at the system level or the interdependent “system-of-systems” level 
and is applicable to any infrastructure. 
Suggested Citation
Verner, Duane, Frederic Petit, and Kibaek Kim. “Incorporating Prioritization in Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience Programs.”  Homeland Security Affairs 13, Article 7 
(October 2017).  https://www.hsaj.org/articles/14091
Introduction
Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne) has developed an optimization algorithm and 
modeling framework capable of identifying the highest-consequence failure points within 
critical infrastructure systems. The optimization algorithm and framework can be applied 
to any infrastructure at the system level or the interdependent “system-of-systems” level 
and can be used to model any combination of infrastructure failures. Results from the 
optimization modeling can be used by analysts to identify priority assets for assessments 
and to assist infrastructure system owners and operators and government agencies when 
they are making critical infrastructure protection and mitigation investment decisions.
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Understanding Infrastructure Failures
A fundamental component of critical infrastructure security and resilience programs should 
include understanding how, why, and where systems fail. This understanding should guide 
decisions on where to conduct in-depth assessments as well as which protection and 
mitigation measures to pursue. However, a complicating factor is that infrastructure failures 
vary significantly. Some failures will generate significant consequences at the system or 
regional level, whereas effects from other failures remain local, while still others have little 
to no effect on the overall service provided. For illustration purposes, Figure 1 shows a 
345-kV electric power transmission system between a generator substation and a remote 
substation.
Figure 01.  Electric Transmission Lines1
In this example, the generation plant produces 1,520 MW2 of power that is transported to 
the remote substation via three transmission corridors. Corridor 1 combines two circuits 
(lines) that allow transport of a maximum of 750 MW. Corridor 2 is a single circuit that allows 
transport of a maximum of 400 MW. Corridor 3 combines two circuits that allow transport 
of a maximum of 800 MW. By design, the three corridors operate below their maximum 
capacity levels, which allows for the relocation of power among the remaining circuits in the 
event of a disruption in one of them. For example, if the Corridor 2 circuit fails, the system’s 
overall vulnerability will increase but it will not experience cascading system failure because 
the two other corridors can compensate for the loss (Figure 2).
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Figure 02.  Loss of Corridor 2 Circuit
Corridor 1 circuits would operate at 97% of their capability and Corridor 3 circuits would 
operate at 91% of their capability. Similarly, the loss of one circuit from Corridor 1 would 
not trigger a cascading system failure because of the ability of the remaining circuits to 
compensate (Figure 3).
Figure 03.  Loss of One Circuit in Corridor 13
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Building on the operating conditions identified in Figure 3, Corridor 3 would operate near 
full capacity (97%); Corridor 2 would operate at 72%; and the remaining circuit of Corridor 1 
would operate at 103%, which, over time, could lead to the loss of the second circuit and 
therefore a failure of Corridor 1 (Figure 4).
Figure 04.  Loss of Two Circuits in Corridor 1 
A loss of Corridor 1 would impede the ability of the two other corridors to operate safely. 
Corridor 2’s circuit would operate at 104% of its capability, and Corridor 3’s circuits would 
operate at 129% of their capability. Under this scenario, the circuits could begin to heat 
and ultimately trip, triggering a system failure. Assuming all other risk factors are equal, 
this simplified example shows that the consequence of disruption of Corridor 1 is greater 
than disruption of Corridor 2, and, as such, Corridor 1 should receive priority when making 
security and risk management decisions.
Infrastructure fails in many different ways with varying consequences. This N-1 contingency 
test shows that this system can sustain the disruption of Corridor 2. However, in our example, 
the loss of one circuit in Corridor 1 would generate an overuse of the remaining circuit in the 
corridor and could lead to additional consequences. The N-1 contingency can be mitigated 
by shedding some of the load to bring the transfer capability in Corridor 1 back to 100%, 
which could avoid problems leading to the N-2 contingency case. The N-2 contingency test, 
resulting in the total loss of the two circuits in Corridor 1, would cascade to the two other 
corridors and lead to an overall system failure.
While this section focused on electric power, there are many similar nuances associated with 
failures in other infrastructure. For example, within the telecommunications sector, loss of 
a cellular tower does not necessarily mean that your phone will lose service, the closing of a 
road does not always mean that you can’t get to your destination, and so on. In other words, 
infrastructure system failures are not all created equal.
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The Need for Prioritization
Without a prioritization process, infrastructure assessment, protection and mitigation 
programs are typically guided by intuition or expert judgement, and they often do not 
consider system-level reliability, redundancy, and overall resilience. While understanding 
how to prioritize high-consequence failure points for assessments and, for protection is 
essential, the complexity of infrastructure systems can quickly overwhelm decision-
makers. For example, in a region with 1,000 electric power assets, almost one million failure 
scenarios are associated with an N-2 contingency, and nearly one billion failure scenarios are 
associated with an N-3 contingency (Figure 5). As a result, system operators and government 
agencies find it technically and financially prohibitive to assess and prepare for all possible 
disruptions. 
Figure 05.  Possible Failure Scenarios with an N-3 Contingency for 1,000 Electric Power Assets
Therefore, a primary goal of critical infrastructure protection and resilience programs should 
be to identify and prioritize critical contingencies affecting infrastructure systems. Achieving 
this goal will allow decision makers to identify high-impact isolated infrastructure failures, 
as well as cascading events, and to prioritize protection investments and resilience planning 
accordingly. Such an approach should also consider infrastructure interdependencies.
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Considering Infrastructure 
Interdependencies
Interdependencies among critical infrastructure assets increase risk to individual assets and 
the overall system. These interconnected infrastructure components constitute a “system 
of systems” where the failure of one or multiple infrastructure elements can cascade and 
affect the resilience of the entire system and ultimately the region. Figure 6 illustrates 
interdependencies among seven different infrastructure sectors and subsectors.
Figure 06.  Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies4
However, as highlighted in the earlier electricity example, simply identifying connections 
between infrastructure does not provide a sufficient understanding of why or whether a 
connection is critical to the operational integrity of the system. The following case study of 
electric power and natural gas interdependencies in Florida further illustrates this point. 
Because Florida is a terminal state, this case study represents one of the simplest examples 
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of interactions between electric power and natural gas because there is no complex 
downstream system to consider that could further propagate the disruption. Furthermore, 
the natural gas system is relatively simple with only two major high-pressure transmission 
pipelines serving the state (i.e., Florida Gas Transmission Co, and Gulfstream Natural Gas 
System). Figure 07.   Cascading Failure Simulation in Florida shows the results of the cascading 
failure simulation between natural gas and electric distribution systems in Florida.
Figure 07.   Cascading Failure Simulation in Florida
The scenario postulates the occurrence of a guillotine (i.e., complete) break on a major 
interstate transmission pipeline supplying natural gas to the state, resulting in a 100% 
reduction in the flow of gas through the pipeline. The pipeline break also disrupts fuel 
delivery to a large number of gas-fired power plants in the state. These power plants would 
cease operation, leading to a statewide electricity outage with varying load curtailment 
intensity ranging from 10% to 100%.5
In addition, the scenario assumed that Florida has three small natural gas processing plants 
located in an area that would experience a 40% percent load curtailment, requiring them to 
curtail operations temporarily. However, because the combined output from these facilities 
is small relative to the total load, the associated gas curtailment would have no notable 
impact on gas customers in Florida.6
As discussed in the previous section, infrastructure failures are not all created equal. When 
interdependencies are involved, a failure in one infrastructure can cascade to other systems 
increasing the overall consequences. Therefore, considering interdependencies should be 
an integral part of critical infrastructure security and resilience programs.
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Applying an Optimization Algorithm to 
Prioritize Infrastructure
Managing risk associated with infrastructure interdependencies requires an understanding 
of infrastructure failures and, especially in complex urban environments, an ability to 
prioritize protection and mitigation efforts. Argonne has developed an optimization 
algorithm for selection and prioritization of infrastructure that runs at the system-level or 
the interdependent “system of systems-level”. The algorithm can apply to the assessment 
of any infrastructure system.
The optimization algorithm assumes that the physical behavior of a system (e.g., a power 
network, gas pipeline, or coupled system) is described by the following optimization problem:
F(d) := minuЄU(d)f(u)
where:
d is the 0-1 vector representing the failures at infrastructure assets,
u is the control(s) that can be manipulated to mitigate disturbances, and
f(u) is a system output metric of interest such as cost, delivered load, or deviations from a 
target operation.
This problem can be solved by the generalized Benders decomposition method proposed 
by Salmeron et al. (2009).7 This method solves the master problem maxdЄDF(d) by iteratively 
approximating the function F(d) with a set of linear inequalities. Set D contains a set of failure 
scenarios denoted by d. An element of the set D is denoted by d = (d1, d2, …, dn), where an 
element di of the vector is either 0 or 1 for i = 1, …, n  to create a combination of the asset 
states. For example, d = (0,0,1,0) can model an event in which, out of n = 4 assets, the third 
asset is disrupted whereas the other assets are not. 
The dependence of the control set U(d) on d captures the fact that the control actions 
available to counteract the disruption might be affected by the disruption d. The control set 
implicitly captures the network topology and physical laws of an infrastructure system.
Worst-case contingency analysis aims to find a contingency that causes the maximum 
damage to the system. The worst-case event (denoted by d(1) can be found by solving the 
optimization problem:
D(1) = argmaxdЄDminuЄU(d)f(u)
The second most damaging event (denoted by d(2)) can be identified by restricting the event 
set as D\{d(1)} and by solving the problem d(2) = argmaxdЄD\{d(1)}minuЄU(d)f(u). This procedure 
can be applied recursively to identify the k-th most damaging disturbance. This step is 
performed by restricting the disturbance set as D\{d(1), d(2), …, d(k-1)}. Our optimization algorithm 
systematically restricts the disturbance set by iteratively adding the linear inequalities to the 
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worst-case interdiction problem. This approach significantly saves the computational times, 
as compared with an exhaustive search.
The algorithmic steps are then summarized for identifying the  most damaging disturbances 
as follows:
1. Create the initial set of disturbances D and the control set U(d) that is dependent on 
disturbance d Є D. Set k = 1.
2. Solve the worst-case interdiction problem to find d(k) = armaxdЄDminuЄU(d)f(u).
3. If k = K, then STOP.
4. Update the disturbance set in order to exclude the k-th most damaging disturbance d(k).
5. Update k = k + 1, and go to step 2.
In step 2 of this algorithm, updating the disturbance set  (step 4) is also equivalent to adding 
a linear constraint to the Benders master problem. The optimization algorithm has been 
implemented in Julia script language, and CPLEX is used to solve the master and subproblems 
in the generalized Benders decomposition.
Argonne has applied this optimization algorithm to a test system of the California Independent 
System Operator (CAISO) interconnected with the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC). The test system is obtained from Kim et al. (2017).8  This test system consists of 
225 buses, 375 transmission lines, 135 generation units, and 40 loads.9 The algorithm ran 
to detect the 100 most critical substations in the system. The criticality of substations is 
measured based on the amount of load lost resulting from the event that a substation is 
disabled. In this computational test, the objective function f(u) is defined as the amount of 
load lost. The control set U(d) is defined by a set of constraints for the security-constrained 
economic dispatch problem as in Kim et al. (2017).10 Note, however, that our algorithmic 
approach is generic to have a user-defined objective function and additional constraints 
(e.g., generation cost, repair time of the failure components etc.). Figure 8 shows the results 
based on the test system.
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Figure 8. Result of the Optimization Algorithm for the Test System of CAISO Interconnected 
with the WECC
In this example, a total of 36 substations resulted in significant load loss and failures; the 
other substations did not cause any load loss. The optimization algorithm terminated after 
the detection of zero-load substation failure. Government analysts and infrastructure 
owners and operators can use this type of information to protect the highest consequence 
failure points within infrastructure systems.
Conclusion
Protecting critical infrastructure, especially in complex urban areas, should focus on 
identifying and prioritizing potential failure points that would have the most severe 
consequences. Applying a technique like this optimization algorithm can inform this 
prioritization process. For example, the algorithm can identify the highest-consequence 
failures resulting from a cyber-attack against a specific critical infrastructure system, or 
identify the most consequential failures affecting complex interdependent infrastructure 
systems supporting a large urban area, regardless of the cause of disruption. Infrastructure 
system owners and operators, and government agencies can use results from optimization 
modeling to identify priority assets for in-depth security and resilience assessments, and 
to inform investment decisions related to critical infrastructure protection and mitigation.
Argonne is currently refining the optimization algorithm framework described within this 
paper through the Resilient Infrastructure Initiative, which is funded through Laboratory 
Directed Research and Development (LDRD) resources.11 The list of critical assets resulting 
from the optimization algorithm can be analyzed further by infrastructure impact models 
such as EPfast12 for electric power. Because of the computational complexity of assessing 
high numbers of infrastructure connections and associated failure scenarios, these studies 
are performed on Blues, a 350-node, high-performance computing cluster at Argonne. 
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Abstract
How is the theory behind critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR) protection evolving? 
Practitioners who implement strategies should be confident their strategies are based on 
sound theory, but theory evolves just as strategy evolves. Many theories, techniques, and 
models/simulations for CIKR protection have been proposed and developed over the years. 
This paper summarizes several of these approaches and explains how they relate to basic 
risk concepts explained in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Risk Lexicon.
We explain unique contributions of ways to model threat, vulnerability, and consequence, 
which have implications for how we assess risk. This work builds on previous work in the 
areas of operations research, prospect theory, network science, normal accident theory, and 
actuarial science. More specifically, we focus on deterrence measurement to characterize 
threat differently. We also explain work that models supply chains or “transfer pathways” as 
networks and applies principles of reliability engineering and network science to characterize 
vulnerability differently. Next, we explain work to incorporate CIKR resilience and exceedence 
probability measurement techniques to characterize consequence differently. Finally, we 
conclude with implications of how CIKR risk may be treated. 
We anchor our exposition of these contributions with various terms from the DHS Risk 
Lexicon. Also, we present these ideas within a framework of three “attack paradigms”: direct 
attacks against a single CIKR with the intent to destroy just that target, direct attacks against 
a single CIKR with the intent to disrupt a system of infrastructure, and exploiting CIKR to 
move a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) through the global commons to its ultimate 
destination.
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Introduction
A strategy for critical infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) protection should have solid 
theoretical underpinnings. How is theory regarding CIKR protection evolving? Practitioners 
who implement strategies should be confident their strategies are based on sound theory, 
but theory evolves just as strategy evolves.
Many theories supporting CIKR protection and resilience have been proposed for application 
or repackaged into new theoretical approaches. This paper will focus on recently proposed 
theoretical approaches to protecting CIKR from terrorism and other threats, summarizing 
the authors’ work in several realms of CIKR protection, and incorporating other insights. 
Importantly, the authors’ work in these domains builds on rich foundations of previous work 
in the risk analysis, network science, reliability engineering, and operations research (OR) 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  3
fields. This paper will minimize technical discussions of each individual theoretical approach, 
and instead will propose how these approaches fit together to support implementation of 
the basic Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk equation Risk = Threat x Vulnerability 
x Consequence. Also, we will anchor our exposition of these approaches with other terms 
from the DHS Risk Lexicon (hereafter “Lexicon”). 
This basic equation still forms the DHS foundation for CIKR risk analysis and mitigation, 
although there are different opinions in the literature on the appropriate ways to characterize 
the finer details of the equation’s components and how data is collected and analyzed.
Background: Current State
The Lexicon defines risk as the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, 
event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.”1 
Likelihood is:
“the chance of something happening, whether defined, measured or estimated 
objectively or subjectively, or in terms of general descriptors (such as rare, unlikely, 
likely, almost certain), frequencies, or probabilities.”2
And, consequence is:
“the effect of an event, incident, or occurrence, including human consequence, 
economic consequence, mission consequence, psychological consequence.”3
So, what are considerations for estimating the chance of a terrorist attack on a CIKR being 
attempted or succeeding, and what are considerations for evaluating effects of an attack on 
CIKR? We now examine context for threat and vulnerability, the combination of which form 
the chance of successful execution of an attack. We also examine context for consequence 
and resilience.
Context: Threat
Threat is the likelihood that an attack occurs, and that likelihood includes attacker intent 
and attacker capability, estimated as probabilities. Ordinarily, threat is an input to the DHS 
risk equation. However, there is a body of literature in the OR world that expresses concerns 
with treating threat as an input to the equation, instead advocating it should be an output. 
This is because terrorists, as thinking adversaries, can adapt to our defenses. For example, 
see Cox (2008)4. If this is true, then intent, expressed as a probability an attack is desired, 
is not necessarily constant. In that case, the quantification of risk would be inconsistent. 
Instead, those in the OR field have suggested that threat should be an output of vulnerability 
* consequence, signifying that prospective attackers formulate intent to attack based on 
observations and estimates of specific CIKR vulnerability and consequence.
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Deterrence: Influencing Attacker Intent
The Lexicon defines deterrence as a “measure that discourages, complicates, or delays an 
adversary’s action or occurrence by instilling fear, doubt, or anxiety.”5 Historical literature 
on deterrence theory and studies of deterrence theory in action tend to focus on what we 
refer to as “absolute deterrence”: influencing an opponent’s decision calculus such that they 
decide not to act. However, we think the concept of “relative deterrence” in CIKR threat and 
deterrence analysis warrants consideration.  The probability of acting in a certain manner 
may constitute a metric for relative deterrence, as opposed to either acting or not acting.
Game Theory and Deterrence
Game theory has been applied to economics and other fields to model interactions and 
expected outcomes. It models the interactions of intelligent agents, often quantitatively so. 
It has also been applied to explain nation-state conflicts. In recent work it has been used 
in counterterrorism modeling. For example, see Yin et al. (2010) who apply game theory to 
develop an “intelligently randomized” homeland security boat patrol model for the U.S. Coast 
Guard.6 The particular approach that Yin et al. develop leverages the concept of a Strong 
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SSE) to model how an attacker can observe a defender’s defenses 
and then pick their best course of action, e.g. attack the CIKR that is the best combination of 
minimally defended and most valuable to attack. One can link the claim that threat should 
be an output of a risk equation to the attribute of game theoretic modeling that yields 
preferences as outcomes of strategic interactions. For example, a “mixed strategy” reflects 
probabilistic preferences of intelligent agents. Evaluating these probabilistic preferences 
may lay the foundation for making claims of “relative deterrence”.
The Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) Threat
There is also a repository of literature that discusses concern over terrorists exploiting 
the maritime supply chain to move a WMD into the U.S. The DNDO, or Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office, was established to help mitigate this threat. Various technological solutions 
and modeling approaches to reduce WMD risk have been explored.
Context: Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the likelihood an attack is successful, given it is attempted.7 Attacks can be 
against individual CIKR with the intent of destroying those CIKR. A second paradigm is that 
attacks might occur against individual CIKR with the intent of destroying/damaging a system 
of CIKR. The Lexicon defines a system as:
“any combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications 
integrated for a specific purpose.”8
Similarly, a network is defined as: 
“A group of persons or components that share information or interact with each 
other in order to perform a function.”9
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If we focus on the vulnerability of systems of CIKR to terrorist attack, perhaps our techniques 
to assess vulnerability should be different than those of the standard individual CIKR 
vulnerability assessment. Network science offers techniques for assessing vulnerability 
of systems to perturbation, considering both the vulnerabilities of individual assets, and 
then characterizing the vulnerability of systems. For examples, see Lewis, 2006, chapter 5,10 
and Lewis, 2009, chapter 11.11  Also, Lewis (2011) defines criticality as the degree of system 
dependence on a single component. But, the Lexicon focuses on criticality of an asset to 
its customer base.12  Perhaps we can stretch the Lexicon definition to mean the “customer 
base” of an asset could include its linked components that form a system.
A third paradigm for framing vulnerability analysis is that CIKR are susceptible to exploitation 
for nefarious purposes, such as moving a WMD through a port infrastructure with the intent 
to detonate in an inland city. Though some CIKR might have great security against direct 
attacks, they might have suboptimal security for interdicting a WMD being moved through 
enroute to a different destination.
In sum, we offer three paradigms for modeling attacks:
Paradigm 1: direct attacks against CIKR with intent to disable/destroy that CIKR;
Paradigm 2: direct attacks against CIKR with intent to cause cascading perturbations 
throughout a system of CIKR; and 
Paradigm 3: exploitation of a CIKR to inflict damage on a different CIKR “downstream” in a 
system.
Context: Consequence and Resilience
We cited the Lexicon definition of consequence earlier. Then, the Lexicon goes on to define 
resilience as the “ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and 
rapidly recover from disruption.”13 Thus, to the extent disruptions create undesirable effects 
or consequences, resilience is the ability to recover from consequences. Vugrin et al. (2010) 
focus on the magnitude and duration of deviations from desired system performance levels 
as two parameters of the ability to recover from disruptions.14
DHS websites on resilience acknowledge the evolution of policy emphasis on resilience 
towards efforts to define it.15 However, when we did our research, DHS policies and programs 
emphasized resilience but did not explicitly guide stakeholders on how to quantify it or how 
to implement resilience measures. So, it falls to academia to propose definitions. 
Evolution: Possible Future States
Given this context, how might theory supporting threat, vulnerability, and consequence 
analysis evolve? We now summarize our work in these areas.
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How We Analyze Threat: The Importance of Deterrence 
and Cognitive Biases
We mentioned earlier that the concept of “relative deterrence” in CIKR threat and deterrence 
analysis warrants consideration. Instead of convincing our opponent not to act at all, or 
conceding they will definitely commit an undesired act, does it make sense to think of 
influencing attacker intent on a spectrum – in probabilities? In other words, is it worth 
exploring the probability one attack is quantitatively more desirable than an alternative 
attack, when multiple CIKR are possible targets? And, should we try to model how attacker 
intent might change, as a proxy for deterrence?
The game-theoretic modeling approaches discussed earlier leverage algorithms that 
produce a probability distribution. This probability distribution is translated into a tactical 
patrol schedule for armed Coast Guard law enforcement boats throughout their area of 
operational responsibility. In theory, executing their patrol schedules according to this 
probabilistic distribution minimizes the chances an observant adversary can plan and 
execute an attack on maritime CIKR. Moreover, in theory this deters an attacker, at least 
from a “relative deterrence” standpoint.
Starting Simple: Quantifying Deterrence
Given our belief that relative deterrence warranted attention, and given that previous 
literature had leveraged game theory to produce a probabilistic approach to deterrence, we 
published a paper entitled “How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure 
Risk” in 2012.16 The thrust of this approach was that deterrence against CIKR attacks can 
be quantified as the extent to which attacker intent to attack a certain CIKR changes after 
security measures are implemented at that CIKR, as compared to attacker intent to attack 
that CIKR before implementation of such measures. The quantification of deterrence took a 
very simple form:
Intent i
pre Intent k l
post
$AB
E l =k Intent ipre $AB
Equation 1. Quantification of deterrence17
The intent values were based on expected utility ratios of pre-security expected utility from 
attacking the CIKR in question, and post-security expected utility. These expected utility 
values were derived from a game theoretical CIKR attack game between a notional attacker 
and notional defender, such as a CIKR operator. 
We claimed that expected utility from an attack should include the quantification of 
attacker capability as a probability, but should exclude probabilistic expressions of intent. 
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This was our “compromise” between the default risk equation that incorporates both intent 
and capability into the threat component, and the Operations Research (OR) community 
objections to including threat as an input because it fails to account for adaptive adversaries.
Also, we used an exploratory approach to the game theoretical scenario, averaging results 
of possible courses of action that the notional attacker and defender faced, rather than 
relying on the theoretical Nash Equilibrium solution of the game. A Nash Equilibrium 
predicts the “optimal” outcome of a game such that each player will choose the best solution 
they possibly can, given their opponent is also trying to pick their own best solution. Thus, 
we hedged for the possibility that an attacker might not necessarily pick the theoretically 
“optimal” solution. 
This work built on a previous thesis which claimed risk propensity, or an actor’s attitude 
toward risk and choice, should influence deterrence.18 In our paper, we made the opposite 
(but possibly complementary) claim: that deterrence should influence risk analysis. We also 
incorporated previous work on modeling vulnerability reduction as an exponential function 
of dollars invested to improve security; Al-Mannai and Lewis (2008) proposed example 
functional forms.19 We treated vulnerability as a linear function of investment, which may 
have been an oversimplification.
Furthermore, we explored conditional and unconditional risk. Unconditional risk reflected 
the risk of CIKR attack given the attacker’s intent (as modified by security investments), 
combined with their capability, vulnerability, and attack consequence. However, conditional 
risk reflected the equivalent of attacker expected utility: the product of attacker capability, 
CIKR vulnerability, and CIKR failure consequence. This was consistent with the Lexicon 
definition of conditional probability: the probability of some event given the occurrence of 
some other event.20 The “other event” we surmised was the attacker decision to attack a 
specific CIKR with 100% intent. Thus, we treated conditional risk as the product of capability, 
vulnerability, and consequence, multiplied by an intent factor of 1.
Finally, we made a case for differentiating tactical intelligence from strategic intelligence 
in a game theoretical context. Strategic intelligence in some CIKR risk tools at the time of 
our writing reflected high-level quantitative estimates of various terrorist group intent to 
attack certain types of CIKR and capability to use various attack modes. As an alternative, 
we proposed that tactical level intelligence with regard to CIKR protection entailed a target-
specific assessment of vulnerability and consequence by a would-be attacker, both before 
and after hypothetical security measures were implemented. This tactical intelligence would 
reflect their target-specific intent to attack (or not attack), and when compared to their 
estimated intent to attack other CIKR, could be leveraged to estimate unconditional risk 
and create “deterrence portfolios” to characterize various security investment options and 
inform decision makers.
One objection we anticipated when we wrote the paper was that deterrence efforts simply 
may shift prospective attackers to other CIKR with higher consequence. This broached the 
concept of threat-shifting. The Lexicon defines threat-shifting as the:
“response of adversaries to perceived countermeasures or obstructions, in which the 
adversaries change some characteristic of their intent to do harm in order to avoid or 
overcome the countermeasure or obstacle.”21 
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The Lexicon then goes into detail about domains in which  threat-shifting can occur, including 
target domain: selecting a less protected target. However, we claimed our approach allowed 
for threat-shifting, more specifically “intent-shifting”, but did not necessarily increase risk to 
the CIKR in the game. 
We applied our methodology to quantify deterrence and measure the change in CIKR risk in 
a notional case study, with the security investments modeled as hypothetical investments 
provided by FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). 
The Lexicon definition of “adaptive risk” includes:
“threats caused by people that can change their behavior or characteristics in reaction 
to prevention, protection, response, or recovery measures taken.”22 
By examining and quantifying how adversaries might assess desirability of various CIKR 
attacks in response to hypothetical protection measures, we add granularity to CIKR risk 
analysis and make more informed CIKR investment decisions. Furthermore, the Lexicon 
claims, 
“for some types of risk, like those involving human volition, the probability of 
occurrence of an event may not be independent of the consequences and, in fact, 
may be a function of the consequences.”23
In our approach, the probability of intent, not of attack occurrence, was modeled as a function 
of a combination of consequences, attacker capability, and modifications to vulnerability, 
based on hypothetical grant investments.
Increasing Complexity - Threat, Deterrence and 
Cognitive Biases
Our work on quantifying deterrence assumed Expected Utility Theory (EUT) applied to 
the expected utility functions. This theory provides that people make decisions linearly, 
estimating costs, benefits, and probabilities. They make decisions consistently across how 
information is provided, or “framed.”
However, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Nobel Prize winning psychologists, showed 
experimentally that people often make decisions inconsistently depending on changes in 
frame, in contravention to the tenets of EUT. They created Prospect Theory (PT) to explain 
their findings. Therefore, in a follow-up piece to our work on quantifying deterrence, we 
modified our approach to account for PT considerations in deterrence. We also explored 
whether information incompletion could influence the quantification of deterrence and 
resulting CIKR risk.
The Lexicon annotates the definition of “social amplification of risk” as follows:
“a field of study that seeks to systematically link the technical assessment of risk with 
sociological perspectives of risk perception and risk-related behavior.”24
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Kahneman and Tversky discovered that people perceived risk differently when prospective 
outcomes were presented as losses from a reference point, rather than gains beyond that 





Figure 1. Relationship between gain/loss and value25
Figure 1 reflects their findings that losses held more “value” or salience to those faced with 
prospects, than did quantitatively equivalent amounts of gain. This finding violated one 
of the central tenets of EUT.  Kahneman and Tversky also discovered a phenomenon they 
dubbed the “certainty effect” meaning that subjects generally preferred certain outcomes 
to probabilistic outcomes. When presented with gains, subjects preferred a certain smaller 
gain to a larger but probabilistic gain. When presented with losses, subjects preferred 
probabilistic larger losses to certain smaller losses, thus reversing the certainty effect and 
yielding the term “reflection effect.” Figure 2 below amplifies on comparisons between EUT 
and PT, although the claims regarding what behavior losses and gains might predict under 
PT assumptions omit a discussion of probability – both the “certainty effect” and “possibility 
effect” that Kahneman discusses in his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow.26
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Low % of high utility
High Certainty Equivalent (CE)
Gamble more preferred than expected value for certain
High CE
Losses predict risk-seeking
Overweight utility when presented 
as loss relative to reference point
High % of low utility
Low CE
Gamble less preferred than expected value for certain
Low CE
Gains predict risk aversion
Underweight utility when presented 
as gain relative to reference point
Figure 2. How EUT (also Subjective Expected Utility or SEU) and Prospect Theory (here called 
“Prospect Utility”) may influence Risk Propensity27
Thus, we applied insights from their discoveries to predict what would-be CIKR attackers 
might prefer from amongst various CIKR attack options. The overall goal of this new 
research was to explain and recommend an approach to support decisions on whether to 
publicize information about CIKR security investments intended to deter attack, or whether 
to obfuscate those investments, by considering what we called “cognitive biases”.
First, we proposed a new definition of a “prospect” to distinguish the use of that word from 
its use in PT. A prospect simply meant the aggregation of possible future outcomes from an 
attacker COA (course of action). We then further specified that an “ordinary prospect” mean 
a prospect not derived from a game theoretic scenario.
We expanded on these definitions of prospect by then proposing the concept of “equilibrium 
prospect” meaning a prospect where the outcomes were influenced by what an intelligent 
opponent might do in a game theoretic interaction. Moreover, we showed what the equation 
for an ordinary prospect might look like if it was modified based on Kahneman and Tversky’s 
findings. This equation would reflect a relationship between gains/losses and value ascribed, 
fitted to the data that Kahneman and Tversky gleaned during their research. 
These differentiations in equations for prospects helped us alter the way we proxied 
attacker intent as we explored how information incompletion and prospect theory could 
influence deterrence quantification and resulting risk. For example, one assumption was 
that an attacker would choose the equilibrium solution to a deterrence game; therefore, 
their quantified intent for that COA would be 100%. Alternatively, they might hedge among all 
prospective outcomes of the game, comparing the expected utility of one possible outcome 
to the aggregate of expected utilities of all possible outcomes, thereby creating an “intent 
ratio” proxy for their intent. Or, they might choose an “aggregate prospect” with maximum 
value with 100% probability - reflecting the sum of expected utilities if the attacker chose 
one COA, but reflecting the aggregate influence of possible defender actions in the game. 
Finally, they might create intent ratios using prospects, rather than using individual game 
outcomes.
We also proposed a heuristic for analyzing outcomes of deterrence games under conditions 
of incomplete information. In this case, the attacker would play a different “game” than the 
defender, since the attacker created proxies for defender deterrence investments at the 
CIKR in the game, whereas the defender knew their true investments. We proposed the 
term “organizational obfuscation bias” or OOB to represent attacker bias under conditions 
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of incomplete information. We proposed business rules for how to quantify deterrence and 
create deterrence portfolios under these conditions.
Furthermore, we used an exponential investment-vulnerability relationship as an alternative 
to the linear relationship from our 2012 paper. Exponential relationships between effort and 
result may be more realistic than linear relationships, especially in counterterrorism analysis 
on the assumption our adversaries adapt to observable (or unobservable) vulnerability 
reduction measures.
Also, in our update we explored the effects of incomplete information. Different authors in 
the deterrence theory literature suggest different things. Some suggest deterrence is most 
effective when both parties share a common estimate of the other’s intentions (for example, 
see Moran, 200228) whereas others suggest ambiguity might actually enhance deterrence 
(for example, see Chilton and Weaver, 2009).29 Furthermore, the game theory literature 
distinguishes incomplete information from imperfect information. The former means that 
if all players can observe opponents’ previous moves in the game, they might not know all 
the rules that define the game. In contrast, imperfect information means that even if players 
know all the rules of the game, they don’t know their opponents’ previous moves. 
Results of Notional Case Study
We varied our deterrence games to assume the attacker had incomplete information and 
thus we used proxy values to represent what they might estimate the quantitative values of 
CIKR vulnerability to be, based on attacker OOB. This yielded results that defender risk was 
less when investments were obfuscated than when they were publicized, for all attacker 
OOBs, and assuming EUT. However, this was specific to the assumption that the attacker 
used an intent ratio for intent proxy, rather than selecting an equilibrium game solution. 
In circumstances when the attacker was presumed to choose the equilibrium solution 
and intent was thus 100%, there was no quantifiable advantage of obfuscating deterrence 
investments over publicizing them, again under EUT assumptions. Quantifiable advantage 
here meant that unconditional risk was lower after change in intent was applied. We also 
found that if we assumed PT held rather than EUT, the defender gained no quantifiable 
advantage of obfuscating deterrence investments, over publicizing them.  
Together, biases from PT and biases from incomplete information formed our “cognitive 
biases.” The implications of our findings were that under circumstances where it would it 
would be quantitatively more advantageous to obfuscate details of possible deterrence 
investments, the government would also have to obfuscate other details such as available 
budgets and estimated reduced CIKR vulnerabilities after deterrence investments were 
made. We therefore expanded upon our 2012 paper claim:
“In order to generalize these findings, any advantage of a specific information 
availability circumstance must be robust given utility theory assumptions.”30 
To conclude our discussion on the evolution of how threat can be treated in CIKR risk analysis, 
we return to the Lexicon which states that risk reduction “can be accomplished by reducing 
vulnerability and/or consequences.”31 However, based on our research, we propose that 
threat reduction, through deterrence quantification and consideration of cognitive biases, 
may be another way to analyze risk reduction.
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How We Analyze Vulnerability: Systems 
Approaches and Organic vs Inherited 
Vulnerability, Or Exploitation Susceptibility
Starting Simple – Transfer Threat Modeling
Our first approach to exploring vulnerability in a new light involved the third paradigm we 
offered for modeling attacks. We explored how to model the concept of “layered defense” 
for defending CIKR networks from exploitation. Previous work on CIKR protection had 
leveraged the concept of fault trees.32 Fault trees showed how a fault, or in the case of CIKR 
risk analysis, a terrorist attack, could propagate throughout a network of CIKR. The Lexicon 
annotates a fault tree as a tool to estimate quantitatively the probability of program or 
system failure by visually displaying and evaluating failure paths.33
However, fault trees only demonstrated what Taquechel (2010) described as “inherited 
vulnerability” or the probability of fault propagation as governed by De Morgan’s Law and 
the logic gates (AND or OR) that connected nodes in the fault tree network. In reality, nodes 
in a CIKR network also have “organic vulnerability” as reflected by their own inherent security 
measures, or lack thereof.34
Thus, Taquechel reasoned that risk of exploiting a network composed of nodes that had 
organic security measures must be assessed using a combination of organic and inherited 
vulnerability terms.  For example, a “terrorist transfer network” of overseas and U.S. ports 
could be rendered as a network of CIKR nodes, with logic gates governing the propagation of 
illicit material between nodes, but with each node having a quantifiable organic vulnerability 
inversely proportional to security measures at the node. Returning to the proposed 
definitions of criticality, perhaps exploitation of this network would depend highly upon 
one very vulnerable foreign port. Alternatively, it might depend on a more holistic measure 
of aggregated network failure probability derived from the combination of organic node 
vulnerabilities and inherited vulnerability of each “layer” of nodes, ports in this case.
Ultimately, we modified Lewis’ Model Based Risk Assessment (MBRA) network modeling tool 
to create a logic graph that leveraged fault tree principles, but added an emergence-based 
algorithm to optimize funding to “harden” ports against terrorist transfer, reducing organic 
vulnerability and thus reducing overall network vulnerability. We combined the concept of 
topology from network science with the classic CIKR risk analysis treatment of vulnerability. 
Topology is a “mapping function” showing the relationship between nodes and links in a 
network.35 It is the “architecture” of the network, which may change over time if the network 
is “dynamic.”36
Logic gates in this approach reflected a different type of topology, wherein they represented 
virtual links between nodes, rather than physical links. The virtual link was a proxy for 
attacker decision making – whether to transfer illicit materials or people through both nodes 
to get to the next node (AND gate), or to transfer materials through a single node (OR gate). 
This extended the existing functionality of the MBRA tool to address a problem of interest 
to DHS as depicted in figure 3.
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Figure 3. MBRA adaptation logic graph: optimal budget allocation minimizes network risk37 
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Preferential attachment undergirds the MBRA algorithm we used to model terrorist transfer 
networks as depicted in Figure 1. Lewis discusses how preferential attachment is a source 
of Self-Organized-Criticality (SOC), meaning a system is on the verge of collapse due to 
emergent processes occurring within the system to make it more efficient during steady 
state functioning, but also more susceptible to failure.38  Essentially, the MBRA algorithm 
is an emergent algorithm that allocates a dollar to a node to reduce organic vulnerability 
(or exploitation susceptibility). It documents the reduction in overall system vulnerability 
and risk. Then, it allocates another dollar at random. If the overall system risk is reduced, 
the dollars remain allocated as such. The algorithm reflects the system’s “preference” for 
allocations that reduce overall risk or increase overall system resilience. However, if the risk 
does not change or is increased, the algorithm “retrieves” the previously allocated dollar and 
searches for another recipient node. This is similar to how ants or termites “self-organize” in 
their flocking behavior as discussed in Lewis (2011).39
Increasing Complexity – WMD Transfer Modeling
With this third paradigm in mind, our initial work treated terrorist transfer threat as a 
general threat in our layered defense modeling. However, we decided to then focus more 
specifically on the WMD (weapon of mass destruction) threat for follow-on work. We also 
decided to merge our concepts of layered defense and deterrence measurement with a 
network science approach in our 2015 paper on measuring the deterrence value of securing 
maritime security chains against the WMD threat.40
In this work, we modeled a supply chain that an adversary might try to exploit by transferring 
a WMD, but we explicitly modeled port “node” vulnerability, or exploitation susceptibility, as 
a function of notional WMD detection technology in those ports. We modeled probabilities 
of encounter and detection at notional U.S. ports of debarkation or ports of entry, holding 
encounter probabilities constant and modifying detection probabilities proportional to the 
investment necessary to build and operate detection technology. The “elimination fraction” 
would represent a 95% probability of detecting a WMD within a container in a U.S. port, 
and the “elimination cost” would represent the investment necessary to build and operate 
technology with that 95% detection probability.  The detection probability was combined with 
the encounter probability in a U.S. port to produce a notional “organic failure susceptibility” 
of that port.
Then, we incorporated logic gate principles from the previous layered defense modeling work 
to proxy attacker “transfer pathways” from foreign ports, through U.S. ports, and ultimately 
to inland “target cities”. These transfer pathways thus represented “inherited exploitation 
susceptibility”, as opposed to inherited vulnerability from previous work. Conceptually, this 
combined technology effectiveness modeling with network theory and is depicted in figure 
4.
We then incorporated concepts from deterrence quantification. Once we could characterize 
the organic exploitation susceptibility of a port, and incorporate inherited exploitation 
susceptibility probabilities from logic gates representing transfer pathways, we then could 
create risk equations, reflecting risk of WMD detonation in a U.S. inland city. These were 
conditional risk equations that excluded attacker intent probabilities.
These conditional risk equations could change based on the different permutations of 
transfer pathways an adversary could exploit to transfer a WMD. We converted the equations 
to utility functions, showing the expected utility an adversary would gain from detonation 
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of a WMD. Doing so allowed us to then create a game theoretic scenario case study wherein 
the defender had different options to invest in WMD detection technology equipment at U.S. 
ports, and the attacker had various pathways to exploit. From this game we gleaned proxies 
for attacker intent, here again an output of risk equations, and created unconditional risk 
equations for the inland cities. This created a different flavor of “deterrence portfolio” from 
the portfolios we had created that reflected attacker intent for direct attacks on CIKR in our 
2012 work on quantifying deterrence. This allowed us to measure how various investments 
in WMD detection technology might deter adversary exploitation of supply chains. 
Overall, this work offered an alternative to a claim in the Maritime Commerce Security Plan: 
that inspecting containers for WMD once they arrive in U.S. ports is too late.42 We suggested 
that this is not necessarily true if the target is an inland city – after the container is offloaded 
onto a truck and moved toward a large inland population center. However, we did not claim 
that it was altogether imprudent to first inspect containers overseas or at U.S. ports of entry.
Results of Notional Case Study
One finding of our case study that applied our methodology was that the best investment 
in WMD detection technology was against a specific transfer pathway that differed from 
what traditional attacker-defender modeling efforts might suggest. This was because our 
methodology did not necessarily rely on the equilibrium output of the deterrence game we 
analyzed, but instead hedged against the possibility that an adversary might not consider an 
“optimal” transfer pathway to exploit.
Another finding was that we could put discussion of possible attacker tactics to move WMD 
into the U.S. into quantitative terms. If a logic gate between a foreign port and a U.S. port 
was “AND”, this represented that the vessel the WMD was secreted upon would stop at two 
foreign ports before its voyage to the U.S. If the logic gate in our model was “OR”, this meant 
the vessel only stopped at one foreign port before its voyage to a U.S. port.
Similarly, an AND gate between the U.S. port node “layer” and target inland U.S. city meant that 
the attacker intended to “decentralize” the introduction of the WMD by offloading component 
parts at one U.S. port. Then, the vessel would continue onto another U.S. port and offload 
the remaining components. Eventually the attacker would arrange for the components to be 
reunited and continue their transit toward the inland target city. Alternatively, the OR gate 
would mean the weapon was moved through a US port of debarkation intact and ready to 
detonate upon arrival at the target city.
A practical implication of this research was that intelligence collection and analysis efforts 
might focus on attacker preferences for exploiting various US ports. This would help inform 
decisions on how to invest in WMD detection technology, accounting for foreign port 
exploitation preferences. To elaborate, if intelligence estimates were confident that multiple 
US ports would be exploited in a WMD component “decentralized introduction” effort, foreign 
port exploitation preferences would be not be especially valuable in informing investment 
decisions, per the model’s approach.
Another practical implication was that the costs to create WMD detection technology 
could be compared to the probabilistic effectiveness of detection, to calibrate a model that 
compared actual investment to “desirable investment” to maximize detection probabilities.
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Figure 4. Notional MBRA WMD transfer network41 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  17
The Lexicon claims that event trees are used to project forward in time, modeling probabilities 
of events leading to some future outcome, whereas fault trees look retrospectively at the 
cause of an event that has already occurred.43 Fault trees leverage logic gates to combine 
probabilities. Even though fault trees are recommended for retrospective analysis in the 
Lexicon, we offer that leveraging logic gates as proxies for attacker decision making and thus 
leveraging the fault tree approach might be a useful alternative for estimating probabilities 
of future terrorist attacks.
How We Analyze Consequence: Resilience, 
Exceedence Probability, Antifragility
Resilience
 The Lexicon defines resilience as the:
“ability of systems, infrastructures, government, business, communities, and 
individuals to resist, tolerate, absorb, recover from, prepare for, or adapt to an 
adverse occurrence that causes harm, destruction, or loss.”44
With this in mind, we refocused our attention on FEMA’s Port Security Grant Program 
(PSGP). Taquechel had worked in an office that provided technical expertise on port security 
to FEMA, and thus developed a technical approach to model grant allocation based on a 
resilience-oriented, network-focused framework. This approach was touted as one option 
to support a prospective policy decision to convert the PSGP program to a resilience-based 
program.
Starting Simple – Networks and Resilience
Returning again to the concept of criticality, we claimed maritime supply chains could be 
modeled as nodes, here ports and inland cities, and links, here means of transportation 
between those ports/cities. We wanted to show that supply chains might depend on ports 
to keep running after a disruption, and proposed an approach to reduce the criticality of 
the ports to the overall supply chain, thereby increasing supply chain network resilience. 
Resilience funding allocations would reduce the cascading economic disruption effects 
caused by port shutdown or damage to port facilities.
First, we discussed the idea that we should identify a certain level of supply chain loss to be 
expected after an attack, but identified challenges with port facilities sharing specific data, 
for fear of violating proprietary data restrictions or disclosing information that would give 
their competitors an advantage. 
Then we claimed the current theoretical foundation underpinning the FEMA allocation of grant 
funding, the classic R=TVC equation, might be insufficient if the grant program transitioned 
to a resilience-based, network-focused approach. This was because this equation did not 
capture network metrics such as node degree (number of links to other nodes), and instead 
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took an asset-centric focus on risk, rather than a network-based focus on system resilience. 
Equation 2 below is a risk equation that accounts for node degree, thus incorporating a 
network metric:
 ∑ ∑=i igVCTR
Equation 2. Risk equation for risk to network with i nodes, g=node degree. Threat (T) is 
generic threat to network.45
We also discussed an approach to modeling system resilience that used network interdiction 
methods, an approach espoused in the OR community, and explained the difference between 
those models and probabilistic risk-based network science models.
Next, we proposed definitions of quantifiable resilience for both individual maritime supply 
chain networks and ports, because our modeling approach leveraged quantitative values of 
risk, thus linking risk and resilience. We also needed our approach to remain fairly consistent 
with the PSGP principle of allocating money to ports, and then the ports redistributing 
money to various claimants such as port CIKR. We further proposed that resilience can be 
organic and maximized with organic CIKR resources, or enhanced/further maximized with 
PSGP allocations earmarked to rebuild damages after an attack. Enhanced resilience can be 
further broken down into mathematically optimal or sub-optimal resilience, depending on 
decision maker preferences for funds allocation.
Our approach integrated aspects of OR “reverse-engineering”, but in a way we did not 
discover during our literature review. Instead of reverse-engineering systems to fine-tune 
performance for steady state operations, our approach would arguably help reverse-
engineer maritime supply chain network “performance potential” to return to standards 
after a perturbation. Also, we proposed how the network science concept of preferential 
attachment, wherein hubs accumulate increasingly more links to other nodes based on 
efficiency and optimization of function, can be counteracted by a different “preferential 
attachment” – the optimization of grant funding towards the most critical hubs to 
minimize port failure after a perturbation and thus maximize supply chain resilience. The 
“counteracting” preferential attachment demonstrated during a simulated distribution of 
resilience funding to network nodes would reduce the economic efficiency-driven SOC that 
had naturally evolved in that supply chain network.
Throughout our detailed explanation of our model’s equations, we used the phrases 
“organic failure susceptibility” and “inherited failure susceptibility” instead of “organic 
vulnerability” and “inherited vulnerability.” We wanted to emphasize that even though the 
event that precipitated a supply chain network perturbation might be paradigm 2, direct 
attack to cause cascading downstream effects, the focus of network resilience modeling was 
susceptibility to failure after the attack had occurred, not the probability the attack would 
occur in the first place.  Thus, we leveraged an approach from our work on layered defense 
against a terrorist transfer network, but modified it to accommodate probabilities of failure 
after an attack had already occurred. 
We then formulated detailed equations for supply chain network “expected consequence” 
that modified maximum consequence by applying the failure susceptibility of the nodes 
in that network. This approach also incorporated a new way to represent inherited 
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failure susceptibility: node degree or how many links the supplier node and other nodes 
had to downstream nodes.  Our previous approaches to modeling inherited exploitation 
susceptibility had treated this probability as a function of attacker preferences as modeled 
via logic gates.
Organic failure susceptibility was now a function of the probability a CIKR node would fail 
to resume production after a perturbation, based on reserve raw product, relationships 
with suppliers, and organic ability to rebuild damaged physical infrastructure onsite. This 
approach leveraged the Lexicon concept of redundancy:
“additional or alternative systems, sub-systems, assets, or processes that maintain 
a degree of overall functionality in case of loss or failure of another system, sub-
system, asset, or process.”46
Then, we created a network conditional risk equation, which excluded attacker intent 
to attack that network, specifically the maritime port CIKR. Next, we combined network 
conditional risk values to create a proxy “port conditional risk value”. Fourth, we developed 
an equation for “port organic resilience” as a function of port conditional risk, and developed 
“resilience ratios” for each port to govern the first “macro-distribution” of PSGP funding to 
individual ports. In an approach that was reminiscent of  how we converted risk to utility for 
deterrence and threat analysis, we converted risk to resilience metrics in this approach. 
Fifth, we showed how our approach could accommodate flexibility to distribute funding 
to ports based on unconditional port risk as an alternative to conditional port risk. This 
leveraged the principle of intent ratios from our work on quantifying deterrence, and 
changed the formulation of the port organic resilience equation. Sixth, we proposed an 
equation for supply chain network organic resilience, to help guide “micro-distribution” of 
PSGP funding or subsequent redistribution to maritime CIKR claimants within each port. 
Just as port organic resilience can be based on conditional or unconditional port risk, we 
showed how to model network organic resilience based on conditional or unconditional 
network risk. 
Seventh, we revisited the MBRA iterative emergence-based algorithm to be used to optimize 
PSGP funding distribution amongst CIKR nodes in each port’s supply chains.  The objective 
function of this algorithm was now to maximize port resilience, enabling us to convert 
organic port resilience to enhanced port resilience. Importantly, this approach optimized 
by allocating to multiple CIKR within a port, rather than allocating all resources to the most 
“attractive” CIKR. Eighth, we explained how this optimization would create enhanced supply 
chain network resilience as a function of network conditional risk after optimal allocation. 
We then summed the new network conditional risk values to get port conditional risk after 
an equilibrium allocation was achieved, and then created a new enhanced port resilience 
value. 
Ultimately, we created an approach to synthesize risk, resilience, network science, 
performance constraints and tradeoffs, optimization, and quantification of deterrence in a 
unified modeling/simulation approach to potentially support a paradigm shift in an existing 
DHS program.
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Increasing Complexity - Normal Accident Theory, Self-
Organizing Criticality, Topology, Exceedence Probability, 
and Antifragility
We now return to the concept of self-organized criticality (SOC). SOC reflects the catastrophic 
failure potential of a tightly coupled system prone to cascading failures. With this in mind, 
we discuss a related theory. Three key ingredients of Perrow’s normal accident theory are 
(1) two failures in a system coming together in an unexpected way; (2) failures cascade 
faster if the system is tightly coupled, and (3) systems prone to normal accident theory 
have “catastrophic potential.”47 Lewis then goes on to explain how power laws can be used 
to model unpredictability in systems, and how coupledness of system components can be 
modeled using network theory. 
Topology can also proxy SOC, as discussed earlier. In previous discussions of approaches to 
characterizing vulnerability, we discussed how logic gates can be a proxy for attacker transfer 
pathway preferences, and are thus a proxy for network topology. Alternatively, we showed 
how the degree of supply chain nodes, node degree being another proxy for topology, can 
influence resilience in the port security grant reallocation approach. Essentially, topology 
influences the coupledness of systems. 
If the topology is such that one hub in a network has many links and other hubs have 
significantly fewer, that network may be considered “scale-free” and likely has a low resilience 
exponent and is a high risk system.  We will explain resilience exponent later. That is, if the 
hub fails and transmits the failure throughout its many links to other nodes, or other nodes 
are cut off from supply, the network fails, possibly catastrophically. 
Thus, topology is related to network fragility. One way a network becomes fragile is “link 
percolation” or accumulation of links at a hub, rendering the system more efficient but also 
more prone to collapse if the hub fails.48 If links percolate at multiple nodes, not just the hub, 
this may have different implications for network topology, fragility, and SOC.
Network Science Metrics, SOC, and 
Organic vs Inherited Failure/Exploitation 
Susceptibility
We can argue that node degree of a network’s hub, or node with highest link percolation, 
is a way to proxy network inherited vulnerability or inherited exploitation susceptibility. 
Furthermore, we can propose that transfer pathways as a proxy for network topology are 
also a proxy for inherited failure or inherited exploitation susceptibility of a network.  This 
dyad of “physical links” vs “virtual links” is now further explained.
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Transfer Networks – Exploitation Susceptibility
A WMD transfer network has high organic exploitation susceptibility if the WMD detection 
equipment at its nodes is poor. Coupled with OR gates between nodes, here meaning 
terrorists prefer to ship the WMD components from one foreign port to one U.S. port of 
exploitation, thus reducing opportunities for detection, this network would have a high 
exploitation susceptibility, would be fragile, and thus would have high SOC. The prominence 
of OR gates as a “virtual link” may have similar effect as physical link percolation, in the 
sense that many links increase exploitation susceptibility by creating many opportunities to 
transfer a contagion throughout a network.
Focusing on organic exploitation susceptibility, Lewis suggests it makes sense to protect 
highly connected hubs to prevent network failure. By increasing security at these hubs, we can 
reduce organic vulnerability or exploitation susceptibility.  Returning to the WMD modeling 
approach, increasing WMD detection technology capability at foreign ports reduces organic 
exploitation susceptibility of those ports. If they are “hubs” for U.S. shipments, meaning 
a preponderance of container ships flow through that foreign port enroute to U.S. ports, 
improving security should in theory reduce overall network exploitation susceptibility and 
reduce risk, the inherited susceptibilities notwithstanding.
Also, networks can be “rewired” to reduce self-organized criticality, thus changing inherited 
failure susceptibility. If a hub has some links removed and re-wired to other nodes, the 
inherited failure susceptibility of downstream nodes might be lowered. To wit, if the newly 
“less connected” node fails, subsequent cascading network failure may be less likely or have 
less impact since fewer nodes depend on the hub.  However, we would have to evaluate the 
flow of a failure throughout the remainder of the network if other nodes now have higher 
degree.
In the case of a WMD transfer network, if an attacker’s desired transfer pathway to move a 
WMD is forced to change to a riskier pathway (e.g. the AND logic gate which means multiple 
ports are exploited, increasing their chances of detection), in effect we have “de-percolated” 
the network. De-percolation may mean reducing the overall number of links in a network, 
but here we suggest it could also mean re-wiring links away from a hub, reducing degree 
of that hub. The parallel argument here is that we have reduced options available to the 
attacker, the equivalent of an AND gate, forcing them to exploit multiple U.S. ports rather 
than just one. We have thereby increased chances of detection, the organic node WMD 
detection capabilities notwithstanding, and arguably have reduced SOC.
Supply Chain Networks – Failure Susceptibility
If a maritime port CIKR has many transportation links leading outward to downstream 
nodes, it has a high degree. Moreover, if that hub and its links (e.g. rail transport in and out 
of a refinery) are poorly protected, that poor security is a proxy for high network organic 
exploitation susceptibility. High organic node failure susceptibility (poor security) but few 
links (low degree) may not have an overall effect on network resilience.
Also, if there are many AND logic gates between nodes, meaning a node needs the supply of 
multiple upstream suppliers, not just one, then that proxy for network topology increases 
the inherited failure susceptibility of the network. Therefore, high hub node organic failure 
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susceptibility, coupled with a certain network topology of logic gates, may increase overall 
supply chain network SOC to the point of high likelihood of collapse.
Link Density and Topology?
Is link density a good proxy for network topology, or helpful for estimating SOC of a network? 
Link density represents the ratio of actual links to possible links in a network.49 Many links 
may mean a contagion (e.g. a container with a WMD) can spread easily through a network, 
meaning a terrorist organization has many options to move the weapon from one node to 
another. However, many links might also mean a network is resilient, meaning if one link that 
moves a commodity to another node fails, other links exist to shoulder the load. So, it may 
depend on what kind of network we are analyzing.
If we are assessing a WMD transfer network, link density may mean there are many links 
between nodes, or that terrorists consider attractive many different possible transshipment 
routes between foreign ports, US ports, and inland cities. Therefore, a transfer network with 
a high link density might naturally be highly exploitable, or have high inherited exploitation 
susceptibility, notwithstanding the organic security at individual ports of embarkation and 
debarkation. This network might be said to have high SOC (unless every individual node 
is highly organically resistant to exploitation). In contrast, a transfer network with low link 
density might mean very few of the possible transfer pathways are attractive to a terrorist 
organization. That network would have low SOC.
However, high link density in a supply chain network such as the one we analyzed in our work 
on the PSGP and resilience might mean something different. If the port “hub” of the network 
fails or supplier nodes are damaged, downstream cascading effects might be minimized if 
there are many links. But this would also require high link security or link resilience. Also, it 
may not matter how many resilient or redundant links exist in the network if CIKR within the 
port “hub” are the sole sources of supply in the network, but are damaged. Thus, link density 
may not be a useful metric to ascertain network SOC in this type of CIKR network.
Other Examples of Organic and Inherited 
Failure/Exploitation Susceptibility
The organic vs inherited failure/exploitation susceptibility dyad appears in other discussions 
of SOC. For example, Lewis (2011) discusses how to minimize the spread of disease through 
analysis of a “social network” of people. Prevention of disease is difficult due to the 
adaptability of microorganisms in response to the evolution of vaccines.50 Therefore, it is 
difficult to reduce the “organic infection susceptibility”, another way of saying “vulnerability 
to disease”, of individual humans. 
However, the alternative could be to change the topology of the human social network through 
quarantining measures. This would in effect reduce “inherited infection susceptibility” by 
increasing the length of the links a disease organism must travel between human “nodes” 
to propagate the infection. Whereas reduction of the number of links in a network is link 
depercolation, here one can conceive how increasing the length of links between people 
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could essentially have the same effect as link de-percolation. Conservation of energy means 
that longer links take energy from shorter links, requiring more expenditure of energy for 
a disease to propagate, and thus decreasing the likelihood of sustained infection within a 
population.51  The individual ability of each person to fight infection when exposed is less 
relevant here; if the disease cannot travel, even the weakest person would be immune.
Lewis summarizes his discussion of de-percolating human social networks by claiming that 
“inoculation is a form of hardening that reduces vulnerability while depercolation is a form 
of resiliency that reduces consequence.”52 Here we expand on that concept and claim an 
alternative interpretation is that inoculation reduces organic failure susceptibility, while 
quarantine and isolation (depercolation) is also a hardening that reduces network- inherited 
failure susceptibility. By making it more difficult for failures to cascade between critical 
infrastructures, for example by increasing redundant sources of supply for downstream 
refineries in a petrochemical supply chain network, we might de-percolate CIKR networks 
through removing or effectively bypassing “infected” links. By doing so, we “isolate” infections, 
here the spread of supply chain failure. Thus, we minimize inherited failure susceptibility, 
and increase resilience and minimize network SOC. 
Long Links: Better or Worse?
Longer links could be good if we are trying to minimize cascading failures brought on by 
epidemics, or in the case of CIKR protection, failures brought on by exploiting maritime ports 
to transship a WMD in a container. However, longer links can also be a burden and increase 
SOC of CIKR networks. This can be demonstrated with a study of the evolution of the power 
sector. Over time, this sector has evolved and approached SOC through a combination of 
economic and regulatory forces. Essentially, longer transmission lines between generation 
stations and customers have increased the fragility of the power network, as these lines 
become subject to failure from excessive load.53 The longer links have the opposite effect if 
we are trying to protect our CIKR from failure; instead of making it more difficult for failures 
to propagate throughout a system, the links themselves are subject to failure. Link density 
and length may represent a catch 22 for network protection and resilience.
Exceedence Probability
Another concept to consider in resilience analysis is that of exceedence probability. The 
components of the standard DHS risk equation leverage probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) 
terms that focus on the probability an attack will be successful given it is attempted. When 
multiplied by consequence of that attack, we get risk. However, what if we instead consider 
the probability that the magnitude (consequence) of an event will exceed a certain threshold, 
rather than focusing on the probability the event will occur in the first place? 
This might constitute a paradigm shift of a different flavor. OR advocates have warned against 
static quantifications of threat, claiming that it fails to account for adaptive adversaries. 
One shift in response to that concern has been to modify the treatment of threat, through 
deterrence measurement as described earlier. However, a second shift could be to consider 
the probability of the consequence exceeding a pre-determined level, hence the term 
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exceedence probability. This way, the issue with static vs dynamic probabilities of attack 
occurrence may be bypassed.
The insurance industry uses exceedence probability to set premiums. For examples, see 
Grossi and Kunreuther.54 More recently, Lewis et al. (2011) have used it to classify various 
hazards CIKR networks face as low risk (high resilience) or high risk (low resilience).55 
Exceedence probability is used to create a “resilience exponent” of a network, shown in 
Equation 3:
 qCCEPPML −== 1)(
Equation 3. Probable maximum loss (PML) as a function of resilience exponent “q”56
Now, instead of PRA, we have PML as an alternative expression of risk, for systems of CIKR.57 
q is the resilience exponent, derived from plotting exceedence probability of the system 
failure exceeding a certain threshold, which yields a power law. If q>1, the system is low risk, 
or high resilience. If q <1, the system is high risk, or low resilience.
Low risk systems, as characterized by Equation 3, may adapt. High risk systems may collapse 
and fail, becoming extinct. This distinction between higher and lower-risk systems can be 
reflected in a feedback loop diagram of “punctuated reality”.
Figure 5. The two major feedback loops of Punctuated Reality58
In this depiction, systems evolve and approach SOC. A “normal accident”, punctuating the 
equilibrium that existed until that point, will occur and the system may adapt, increasing SOC 
even more and re-establishing a new equilibrium. However, a “black swan” event of much 
higher consequence but lower probability may occur, driving the system toward extinction 
rather than adaptation. Low risk (high resilience) systems may be grouped with those that 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 8 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Taquechel & Lewis,  A Right-Brained Approach to CIP Theory  25
can achieve small adaptations, but also withstand black swan events, whereas high risk (low 
resilience) systems may become extinct after a black swan event cripples that system.
Returning to the discussion of supply chain networks and resilience, over time these systems 
might evolve to become more efficient. However, what happens when a Deepwater Horizon 
occurs? Arguably this was a Black Swan-type event. This paper does not explore the details 
of how the petrochemical supply chain in the Gulf of Mexico was impacted, but imagine if 
the system was optimized such that the Deepwater Horizon platform was the sole source 
of feedstock to the major Gulf refineries? From an economic standpoint, that might have 
made sense, but from a redundancy and resilience standpoint, the consequences could be 
catastrophic.
SOC can be reduced, and system resilience thus increased, by “increasing the resilience 
exponent” of a system per Equation 3. How do we do this for CIKR systems? Lewis proposes 
some ways: adding surge capacity, operating systems below capacity, and redesigning 
networks altogether.59 But, these solutions are not without costs. 
The Future – “Antifragility”?
In addition to SOC and exceedence probability, can we extend past resilience and apply 
the concept of antifragility to CIKR protection? Nassim Nicholas Taleb has written about 
the concept of “antifragility”, which essentially describes systems that actually benefit from 
disorder, rather than suffer.60 He emphasizes in his works that antifragility is not the same as 
resilience. The latter term means the ability to return to a pre-perturbation state; whereas 
the former term means the system will exceed pre-perturbation performance levels. 
This is an interesting concept to explain complex systems like the stock market, where Taleb 
has experience and observed phenomena that influenced his theories and publications, 
but what are the implications, if any, for CIKR system protection and resilience? Taleb 
differentiates between “mechanical” systems, that wear from use, and “organic” systems, 
which actually benefit from stress and (reasonable) perturbations.61 For example, humans 
as organic “networks” of organ systems and sub-systems benefit from strenuous exercise 
over time, whereas a washing machine will wear over time with strenuous use, even with 
consistent maintenance. If we believe CIKR networks are “mechanical” systems, it may be 
futile to hope perturbations are beneficial. However, if we believe the “organic” model can 
be applied to CIKR networks, perhaps systems of CIKR can improve after shocks.
For example, how will the Gulf coast petrochemical industry network adapt to Deepwater 
Horizon? It may be too early to tell, but many years from now, we might compare productivity 
and other appropriate metrics to pre-Deepwater levels, and conjecture whether this disaster 
contributed to long term improvement in petrochemical supply chain network management. 
An example from popular culture could further illustrate. In Forrest Gump, the protagonist’s 
shrimping vessel was subject to perturbations during the storm, but was robust to the 
elements and survived, while the rest of the fleet was brittle as they were tied up at the 
pier and were destroyed by the elements. Gump’s subsequent monopoly on the shrimping 
industry may reflect a flavor of “antifragility” if we consider the entire shrimping community 
as a network. In fact, the shrimping business might have improved from pre-storm levels. 
With less competition, the risk of overexploiting the resource may have diminished, allowing 
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better stock health and improving the overall market. This may be an example of a mitigating 
effect on the “tragedy of the commons”, where a common resource is overexploited to the 
eventual detriment of all. Taleb claims that “the antifragility of some comes necessarily at 
the expense of others.”62
Organic systems supposedly respond to acute stressors better than chronic stressors.63 
As a real world example, one author has claimed downtown Manhattan, as an “economic 
system”, may have benefitted from the tragedy of 9/11.64 It may seem distasteful to claim 
that long term benefit is a product of disaster, but if we look at the hard numbers, we may 
have a case. Arguably, 9/11 was an “acute stressor.”
Also, organic networks tend to be self-healing.65 During 2012, the New England and New 
York petrochemical facilities adapted in the aftermath of Hurricane SANDY. They found 
feedstock from other sources and shared information that they might otherwise manage as 
proprietary information, to facilitate recovery. Does any data support that those networks 
are stronger now than they were before SANDY?
Returning to the concept of resilience exponent, the Taleb arguments might extend the 
utility of this exponent beyond only representing a proxy for system resilience. Could we 
hypothesize that q could predict antifragility of CIKR networks? The lower the exponent, 
the more likely the system could benefit from perturbation, increasing output or other 
performance metrics. This claim would be subject to modeling/simulation and real world 
event validation. 
In our 2013 paper on PSGP resilience, we emphasized that the “desired” post-perturbation 
system performance level would have to be agreed upon in order to establish a baseline 
for the resilience modeling effort.66 If stakeholders agree that a goal should be to come 
back stronger after a perturbation, this would transition the notional model from resilience 
evaluation to antifragility evaluation. It is unclear how specific resilience investments to 
rebuild damaged infrastructure would increase productivity beyond pre-perturbation levels, 
but this is an exercise for future research.
However, there are also arguments against conceptualizing CIKR networks as organic 
systems. We might claim that if individual CIKR within a network were antifragile, that means 
the system is also antifragile. For example, as we improve ability to restore node productivity 
past pre-perturbation levels, thus improving overall system resilience, we might improve 
system antifragility. However, Taleb’s claim regarding organic system antifragility is that the 
individual component is fragile whereas the whole is antifragile. Taleb offers the example 
of genes: humans are individually fragile and thus die, but we may propagate our genetic 
information before death, meaning the human race writ large is antifragile.67 Therefore, 
this concept might not apply to networks if we claim improving hubs improves the overall 
network.
Survival of the Fittest?
Taleb discusses the concept of autophagy, wherein weaker cells in an organism are killed, 
but the remaining cells become even stronger.68 Can we apply this concept to the CIKR 
network discussion? This might suggest that laissez-faire economic policies to let industry 
grow unchecked and let market forces govern would be the ideal approach. The weaker 
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industries would fail or be subject to merger/acquisition. Taleb advocates against excessive 
intervention in the markets, citing the concept of “iatrogenics” — intervention to manage 
complex systems that yield long term deleterious effects exceeding benefits of that 
intervention.69
However, Lewis might argue that laissez-faire policies would enable the evolution of SOC 
in CIKR networks — economic efficiency at expense of resilience. History has shown that 
various sectors in the economy tend toward SOC when de-regulated. This would make 
networks fragile, not antifragile. Therefore, some government regulation might be necessary 
to ensure antifragility.
A third view could be that is it better for overall antifragility to let SOC evolve and then 
weaker CIKR systems are eliminated during a punctuated equilibrium or Black Swan event. 
This would be some low probability but extremely high consequence disaster that affected 
business networks in a way that the SOC made them vulnerable to. The weak networks 
would collapse; the resilient networks would survive; antifragile systems would “thrive” and 
benefit from perturbations. Survival of fittest at the “national economy” ecosystem level, 
if not at the individual CIKR system level, could be the best approach. Managing public 
expectation for supply of certain commodities would be critical.
Taleb claims “antifragility of higher levels may require the fragility of lower levels within 
an ecosystem.”70 In other words, local but not global overconfidence is good within the 
economic ecosystem — we want individuals to take risks and fail which means systems 
should improve over time.71 We might extend this argument to claim that individual business 
systems will take risks and fail, which means the national economy should in theory improve 
over time as lessons are learned (and hopefully heeded!)
A final thought on Taleb’s analysis. He discusses “transferring fragility from the collective 
to the unfit.”72 For example, in 2009 the federal government bailed out failing banks. Did 
this make them more fragile over the long term because they did not have to bear the 
consequences of their decisions? Applying this logic to the PSGP program, if we subsidize 
maritime CIKR “hubs” through port security grants, we harden the hubs and increase 
resilience from a network science perspective — but are we inadvertently harming the system 
by decreasing self-reliance in those hubs? If left to their own devices but encouraged to be 
individually antifragile, without government subsidy, would they ignore that encouragement 
and continue to optimize for economic efficiency but decrease system resilience? 
SOC arguably reflects the reverse argument: transfer of fragility from the individually unfit 
MCIKR to the collective. As a hub accumulates more influence over a network (e.g., through 
link accumulation) but fails to increase security or individual node resilience, the entire 
network resilience may suffer as a perturbation to that node could have cascading effects 
throughout the entire system. Again, we are back to a dilemma: do we allow market forces 
and deregulation to permit SOC and transfer of fragility from the unfit to the collective, 
knowing that if a system fails, the next system may or may not be stronger? Or, do we 
transfer fragility from the collective to the unfit and regulate industry such that resilience is 
increased but economic efficiency may be stifled? Is there a balance between the two goals?
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Alternative Futures
The Lexicon defines “alternative futures analysis” as:
“a set of techniques used to explore different future states developed by varying a 
set of key trends, drivers, and/or conditions.”73 
One example is a statistical forecasting technique known as Winter’s method, used in the 
past by DHS to project anticipated migrant flow in the Caribbean based on political and 
economic “push-pull” factors. If these alternative futures techniques included forecasting of 
probabilities, Taleb might object, as the “black swan” or low probability, high-consequence 
event cannot be predicted by ordinary probability estimates. Therefore, to have credibility in 
Taleb’s world, alternative futures analysis might predict the range of possible consequences 
of an outcome, and then decision makers could hedge for the worst case consequence, 
rather than relying solely on probability estimates. If we adopted this philosophy, we would 
be well advised to look at the magnitude and reach of previous disasters, and optimize 
systems for these consequences first, and then make refinements for economic efficiency 
second.
Putting It All Together: Implications for 
CIKR Protection and Resilience?
We have given examples of how to analyze threat, vulnerability, and consequence in different 
ways. If we use intent as the output of game theoretic modeling, our risk equations may 
account for “tactical intelligence” as well as “strategic intelligence” and may have implications 
for deterrence. If we model layered defenses against terrorist transfer of WMD as a network 
and use logic gates as proxies for attacker preferences, absent more specific intelligence, 
this approach may provide us with alternate analysis to inform where to invest in WMD 
detection technology. If we model ports as “hubs” with downstream customer networks, 
and estimate network resilience, that may have implications for how we allocate funding to 
protect our port infrastructure through grant programs.
Also, if we calculate exceedence probability and probable maximum loss to CIKR networks 
instead of the traditional PRA calculations, would this have implications for how we allocate 
resources? Should we allocate prevention-based resources to high risk/low resilience 
systems to try and protect against the “black swans”? For higher-resilience or lower risk 
systems, should we allocate resources toward responding to higher probability, but lower 
consequence events? Finally, is resilience enough? Are there ways to engineer CIKR systems 
to come back even stronger after a perturbation, or promote “antifragility”?
The Lexicon defines “risk governance” as:
“actors, rules, practices, processes, and mechanisms concerned with how risk is 
analyzed, managed, and communicated.”74
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If we believe the theories behind CIKR risk analysis, protection, and resilience are evolving, 
then that naturally influences the “rules, practices, and processes” concerned with how risk 
is analyzed, managed, and communicated. The DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
(QHSR) of 2014 emphasizes deterring terrorists, interdicting WMDs, and safeguarding 
legal trade.75 It also acknowledges CIKR network interdependencies, and that networked 
partnership is important to combat terrorism. We hope that the ideas posed in this paper 
will help inform theory and practice as the homeland security and emergency management 
enterprise evolves in its understanding of risk. 
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Abstract
Despite the emphasis on resilience, disasters continue to challenge the response 
capacities of communities around the United States. These challenges are generated by 
the complexities and uncertainties present in the post-disaster environment. This article 
presents the findings of an exploratory investigation into the development and evolution of 
four disaster response networks that formed along the Gulf Coast, Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita in 2005, and Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Ike in 2008. Using data collected 
from newspaper articles that referenced each hurricane during a period that spanned six 
days prior to landfall to twenty-two days after landfall, we identified the organizations 
that participated in each response network. We then used UCINET 6 to calculate network 
density and degree centralization, plotted longitudinally by date, and evaluated whether 
each network underwent structural change. The findings demonstrate that all four 
response networks underwent structural change, as a large heterogeneous collection of 
response organizations came together, collected and disseminated information, and sought 
to identify and implement solutions that would address the needs of those affected by the 
disaster event. While additional research is necessary to reveal the causal factors behind 
these structural changes, the findings presented in this article suggest that investments 
in information communication technologies, such as those made by the state of Louisiana 
after Hurricane Katrina, can help to facilitate the resilience of disaster response networks.
Suggested Citation
Haase, Thomas W., Gunes Ertan, and Louise K. Comfort. “The Roots of Community Resilience: 
A Comparative Analysis of Structural Change in Four Gulf Coast Hurricane Response 
Networks.”  Homeland Security Affairs 13, Article 9 (October 2017).  https://www.hsaj.org/
articles/14095
Introduction
The concept of resilience has become a central focus of emphasis for disaster and emergency 
management researchers and policy-makers. The United States Department of State officially 
recognized resilience, defined as “the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, 
withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption.”1 The U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
(2012) further refined this definition in its report, Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, 
which serves as a working guide to resilience studies in both research and practice. Likewise, 
the Department of Homeland Security indicated that strengthening resilience was one 
of its five critical missions in its 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.2 The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also considers resilience to be a component of its 
National Preparedness Goal, which it identifies as “[a] secure and resilient nation with the 
capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, 
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”3
Despite the emphasis on resilience as a public policy goal, disasters continue to challenge 
the response capacities of communities around the United States. These challenges are 
generated by the complexities and uncertainties present in the post-disaster environment. 
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For public managers, complexity refers to the characteristics of a system, which means 
that complexity can refer to ill-structured administrative problems,4 mismatches between 
organizational structures and operational conditions,5 and the inability to identify and 
understand the linkages that exist within a system.6 Uncertainty, in contrast, refers to the 
sense of doubt that blocks or delays a decision maker’s actions.7 According to Elinor Ostrom, 
policy institutions often provide policy actors with the opportunity to pursue multiple policy 
choices.8 Since the choices taken by policy actors are often interdependent, this variety of 
choices can create uncertainty in the policy environment. Thus, a decision maker may know 
the type of action that she should take to obtain a certain outcome, but in an uncertain 
environment, she is unable to predict with any degree of confidence which of the possible 
actions will enable her to obtain the desired outcome. 
In a disaster management context, complexities and uncertainties can undermine 
administrative effectiveness9 and generate cascades of failures.10 When such failures occur, 
the activities undertaken by disaster response organizations can become delayed, sporadic 
and ineffective, thereby leaving vulnerable populations subject to further risk. Recognizing 
this constraint, some governments have sought to manage uncertainty and complexity by 
using information technologies to facilitate information exchange and improve decision 
making.11 Thus, an important question is whether, and to what extent, access to information 
shapes the capacity of an organizational network to mobilize and structure disaster response 
operations? 
This article presents the findings of an exploratory investigation into whether investments in 
information technology can affect the structural development and evolution of four disaster 
operations networks that formed in response to hurricanes along the Gulf Coast.12 Two of 
these networks formed in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Hurricane Rita in 
Texas. The other two networks formed in 2008 after Hurricane Gustav in Louisiana and after 
Hurricane Ike in Texas. After a brief introduction to resilience, this article explores three 
streams of literature relevant to this inquiry: inter-organizational network theory, complex 
adaptive systems theory, and social-technical systems theory. The second section reviews 
the four cases investigated by this study, focusing on the consequences of the events and 
the operational conditions under which the disaster response networks emerged. The 
third section presents the study’s research questions and methods of analysis. After the 
presentation of the findings, the article concludes by identifying policy implications for 
improving resilience of disaster response networks.
Resilience as an Evolving Concept
Aaron Wildavsky defined resilience as “the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after 
they have become manifest, learning to bounce back.”13 Alternative definitions construe 
resilience as the adaptability of systems to new environments through rapid transformation 
of existing resources to new demands. These approaches underline the role of information 
and information exchange in the facilitation of resilience.14 Although the focus of significant 
discussion, disaster management scholars and practitioners have yet to formulate a 
consensus as to what resilience means and how resilience should be evaluated. Recent 
research into the components and indicators of community resilience, however, has begun 
to advance the study of resilience.15 Ashley Ross, for example, conceptualizes resilience as a 
dynamic phenomenon that is driven by a set of adaptive capacities and processes.16 In this 
article, we applied this definition of resilience to the study of disaster response networks. 
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Three streams of literature are relevant to this investigation of resilience in disaster response 
networks.
Inter-Organizational Networks 
According to Michael McGuire, networks are “multiorganizational arrangements for 
solving problems that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by a single organization.”17 
These networked arrangements are considered superior to traditional administrative 
structures. Networks provide an alternative to hierarchy and specialization, meaning they 
can accommodate a diversity of organizations – public, private, and nonprofit – which 
can work together to achieve collective goals.18 Networks are also highly flexible, enabling 
their constituent organizations to adapt their interactions in response to changes in the 
operational environment. Further, networks are scalable to the extent that their participants 
have the capacity to seek assistance from other organizations, whether vertically by level of 
jurisdiction or horizontally by source of funding. Finally, networks enable participants to 
identify and acquire the information and resources they need to complete their activities.19 
Provan and Kenis note that networks provide a community of organizations with the 
structure they need to interact with one another and engage in learning activities.20 As such, 
a network of organizations designs a structure that enables its members to learn how to 
modify their activities within, and in response to, the complexities and uncertainties present 
in the operational environment.21 Similarly, a network’s interaction structure can facilitate 
the efficient distribution of resources, which is important for disaster response networks.22 
As they work to structure and re-structure their relationships, organizations in a disaster 
response network can quickly locate resources such as information, money, personnel 
and equipment, and move these resources to where they are needed. Although the inter-
organizational network literature suggests that networked governance structures are 
better positioned than traditional governmental structures to address the dynamic and ill-
structured policy problems, the literature does not specify the processes that organizations 
would use to overcome the uncertainties and complexities present in the operational 
environment. 
Proposition 1: A resilient disaster response network will be comprised of a 
heterogeneous collection of organizations that interact with one another to pursue and 
obtain collective goals.
Complex Adaptive Systems
A second stream of literature suggests that a disaster response network comprised of a 
heterogeneous collection of organizations may have the capacity to adapt in response to 
the uncertainties and complexities of changing environments.23 This adaptive capacity 
emerges when a system of organizations operates as a complex adaptive system, that is, 
a non-linear system of interdependent agents that collectively learn how to adjust their 
activities in reaction to environmental changes.24 The agents present in such systems 
receive information about the external environment. When a decision is needed, agents use 
internal models of rules to analyze the information they receive, which gives them insight 
into the actions that they should take. These rules draw upon internal cognitive building 
blocks, which agents employ to simplify their environment.25 In the public administration 
context, these building blocks take the form of signals that may be communicated through 
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memoranda and directives, and boundaries that may be established by legislation and 
agency mission statements.26
Complex adaptive systems theory can be used to investigate the resilience of disaster 
response networks. In the words of Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen, a system of agents 
can harness complexity by acknowledging the interdependent relationships that exist in a 
system and taking deliberate action to restructure the system to align with a desired measure 
of performance.27 For example, a policy-maker might encourage the organizations in a 
disaster response network to modify their actions by permitting them to exploit emergent 
opportunities and rewarding them when they identify novel solutions.28 Policy-makers may 
encourage organizations to modify their interaction patterns by enabling them to make 
internal procedural adjustments or by adjusting their operational environment, perhaps by 
exempting them from regulatory requirements during a crisis. Finally, policy-makers may 
encourage organizations to identify and select successful strategies by providing them with 
a clear understanding of what constitutes success, and rewarding them when they cast 
aside ineffective strategies.29 In a disaster context, inter-organizational relationships are a 
central aspect of this adaptive process because they lead to the development of “networks 
of reciprocal interaction that foster trust and cooperation.”30 
Proposition 2:  Learning, adaptation, and structural adjustment to environmental 
uncertainties and complexities are indicators of resilience in a disaster response network. 
Sociotechnical Systems and Information Technology
A third stream of literature suggests that information technology can support a disaster 
response network’s capacity to adapt to uncertainty and complexity. That is, information 
technology represents a tool that can bring together a disconnected and spatially separated 
community of organizations.31 Information technology provides officials with the ability to 
scan the operational environment, detect and verify potential risks, and transmit risk and 
response information across an expansive network of organizations charged with disaster 
management and operational responsibilities.32 
Albert Charns argued that the integration of technology within a social structure leads 
to the development of a sociotechnical system.33 Herbert Simon considered design as a 
means of structuring relationships among human beings, organizations, and technology.34 A 
sociotechnical system drives the processes of adaptation within a networked system, thereby 
enabling it to adjust and reorganize as required by changing conditions in the environment.35 
There are several ways that technology can strengthen the capacities for performance and 
processes of adaptation in disaster response networks. The National Academies of Sciences 
identified three disaster management functions that were enabled through information 
technology: 1) robust, interoperable and priority-sensitive communications; 2) development 
of situational awareness and common operating picture; and 3) improved decision 
support, resource tracking, and resources allocation.36 All three functions are supported 
by information technology that, properly designed and implemented, can facilitate learning 
and adaption in a disaster response network. 
Proposition 3: Information Communication Technologies (ICT), properly designed 
and implemented, can facilitate resilience (learning, adaptation, and structural adjustment) 
within disaster response networks. 
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An extensive body of literature focuses on networks and their roles in disaster management 
contexts. Empirical investigations of disaster response networks, for example, often 
focus on networks at a specific point in time (e.g., a single day) or as an aggregation of 
several points in time (e.g., a collective set of days or weeks). Investigations such as these 
have demonstrated the importance of disaster response networks and the existence of 
problematic resource and information gaps between organizations.37 In the context of 
resilience, however, these studies provide little insight into how disaster response networks 
emerge or evolve over time. Further, the literature on disaster response networks says little 
about network effectiveness, suggesting that the factors or conditions that promote or 
inhibit the resilience of disaster response networks are not yet fully identified. Relatedly, the 
extent to which policy changes might influence the emergence, evolution, and performance 
of disaster response networks is not yet known.  
Case Study Selection
To evaluate the three propositions identified above, we conducted a small-n case study of 
the interaction structures of disaster response networks that formed after four Gulf Coast 
hurricanes. Specifically, we identify and compare the structural features of the organizational 
response networks that formed in 2005 following Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and 
Hurricane Rita in Texas, with those that formed in 2008 following Hurricane Gustav in 
Louisiana and Hurricane Ike in Texas.
Louisiana: Hurricane Katrina, 2005 and Hurricane 
Gustav, 2008
Classified as one of the deadliest disaster events in the history of the United States, Hurricane 
Katrina struck the coast of Louisiana east of New Orleans the morning of August 29, 2005. 
Although New Orleans managed to withstand Hurricane Katrina’s impact, the storm surge 
and rainfall-induced flooding caused the subsequent failure of the levee systems, which 
inundated large portions of the city. In the days that followed, disaster management officials 
worked to avert an even larger humanitarian catastrophe. The federal government reported 
that Hurricane Katrina affected 41 of the state’s 64 parishes, caused approximately 1,100 
deaths, and generated US$ 100 billion of damage.38 Approximately three years later, on 
September 1, 2008, Hurricane Gustav came ashore in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana as a 
Category 2 storm. The National Weather Service reported that Hurricane Gustav weakened 
to a tropical depression, but continued to produce severe winds, tornados, and substantial 
rainfall, as much as twenty-one inches in some areas, as the storm slowly moved north 
beyond Baton Rouge.39 In Louisiana, Hurricane Gustav was responsible for seven deaths and 
an estimated US$ 4.618 billion of damages.
Texas: Hurricane Rita, 2005 and Hurricane Ike, 2008
Less than three weeks after Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 Hurricane called Rita was 
moving towards the western coast of the Gulf of Mexico.40 Given the devastation wrought 
by Hurricane Katrina, government officials were concerned about the threats that Hurricane 
Rita posed to the oil and gas industry. Equally important, Hurricane Rita threatened the city 
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of Houston, so officials ordered wide scale evacuations. According to the National Weather 
Service, Hurricane Rita came ashore between Sabine Pass, Texas and Johnson’s Bayou the 
morning of September 24, 2005 as a Category 2 Hurricane. Fortunately, the region avoided 
a catastrophe, with only two reported fatalities. Nevertheless, Hurricane Rita caused more 
than US$ 12 billion of damages. In after action reports, discussions about the governmental 
response to Hurricane Rita focused on the massive traffic jams caused by the evacuation 
orders. On September 13, 2008, almost three years after Hurricane Rita, a Category 2 storm 
named Hurricane Ike made landfall near Galveston, Texas.41 Along Galveston Bay, the storm 
surge increased to between ten and fifteen feet. Hurricane Ike’s sustained winds generated 
several tornados and severely damaged Houston’s downtown area. The storm took the 
lives of 21 Texans, and at least 16 people remained missing as of August 2011. Hurricane 
Ike became the third most expensive hurricane in the history of the United States, with 
damages estimated to be more than US$ 29.5 billion.42
Separated by a period of three years, these two sets of hurricane events make it possible 
to compare the structures of the disaster response networks that emerged to operate in 
the same general region of the United States. Many of the organizations, especially the 
public emergency management agencies, were present in both Louisiana and Texas for all 
four hurricanes, which increases the comparability of these disaster response networks. 
However, while activities of Texas and Louisiana were guided by federal laws and policies, 
each state had developed different perceptions of risk, and made different policy choices 
regarding the management of information in their respective communities in the months 
and years that followed the first hurricane event. Given that these four cases represent a 
valid small-n field study for the examination of the resilience of disaster response networks, 
we investigate the theoretical propositions stated above through an exploration of four 
comparative research questions:
1. To what extent were the four disaster response networks characterized by heterogeneity 
in contrast to homogeneity in the respective sets of participating organizations? 
2. At what rate did response organizations interact with other organizations in these four 
disaster response networks? 
3. To what extent did the interactions exchanged among response organizations drive the 
structural evolution of these four disaster response networks? 
4. To what extent did investments in information technology and training between hurricane 
events facilitate structural changes in the disaster response networks? 
Methods
This article investigates the resilience of the disaster response networks that emerged after 
hurricanes that occurred in 2005 and 2008: Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav in Louisiana 
and Hurricanes Rita and Ike in Texas. To answer the research questions stated above, we 
collected, coded, and analyzed data obtained from newspaper articles and government 
reports that covered the response activities that occurred before and after the hurricanes 
made landfall. The processes that we used to collect and analyze our data are discussed in 
the following subsections.
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Data Collection and Coding 
The data came from newspaper articles from the Times Picayune and the Houston Chronicle, 
which are respectively published in New Orleans, Louisiana and Houston, Texas. These 
articles covered the activities undertaken by the response networks that formed after each 
hurricane event, and constitute a day-to-day record of the activities undertaken by the 
organizations participating in each network. To focus our data collection activities, we used 
time and shared behavior to set the boundaries of the disaster response networks.43 Then, 
we conducted keyword searches in the LexisNexis Academic Database to identify articles that 
referenced each hurricane by name and were published between six days prior to landfall 
and twenty-two days after the storm made landfall. We classified articles as relevant if they 
referenced activities that fell within the fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) covered 
by the National Response Plan44 and the National Response Framework.45
We then coded the content of the newspaper articles and created Excel databases for each 
hurricane response network. To create these databases, we reviewed each article and 
identified the organizations reported to be involved in the response network. We assigned 
each organization a numerical identifier and an acronym, and classified the organizations by 
the date they became active in the response network, their source of funding (public, private, 
or nonprofit) and their level of jurisdiction (national, regional, state, county, or city). We also 
identified the interactions exchanged between organizations and coded each interaction 
as a separate transaction. All interactions were coded as non-directional and unweighted, 
since the news articles did not always indicate which organization initiated the transaction 
or the number of interactions that occurred. 
We removed duplicate and irrelevant entries from the Excel databases and cleaned the data 
to ensure the consistency in organizational names, acronyms, source of funding, and level 
of jurisdiction. To ensure reliability, all co-authors participated in the coding processes and 
we conducted weekly comparisons to corroborate coding results. We also cross-referenced 
results from the content analysis with activities reported in government situation reports 
and found them to be consistent. After the databases were finalized, they were converted 
into four sets of relational matrices. We generated one set for each hurricane event, with 
each set comprised of twenty-eight separate relational matrices. Each relational matrix 
represented one day included in the analysis. We then refined each matrix by excluding 
isolated organizations, meaning we removed organizations that were not engaged in 
interactions with other organizations.
Data Analysis 
We used multiple methods to analyze the data for each of the disaster response networks. 
We began by generating descriptive statistics to reveal the organizational composition of 
each network. We used Excel to generate tables that reported the numbers, jurisdictional 
levels, sources of funding and frequency distributions of the organizations detected in 
each disaster response network. We also plotted longitudinally, by date, the rate that the 
organizations became active in each disaster response system, as well as the number and 
type of interactions undertaken by each organization. We used these data to address our 
first and second research questions.
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We used the network analyses software UCINET 6 to evaluate the data contained in our 
four sets of relational matrices.46 We used two common network level network measures to 
reveal the structure of the networks: density and degree centralization. We calculated these 
statistics for each of the twenty-four relational matrices included the period under analysis, 
and plotted the results longitudinally, by date, to evaluate whether each network underwent 
structural change. We then used these data to address our third research question. To 
address our final question, we reviewed governmental reports to determine whether Texas 
and Louisiana underwent policy changes or made investments in information technology 
between 2005 and 2008.
Research Assumptions 
The application of the methods described above were subject to four assumptions, which 
enabled us to isolate the changes in interaction patterns within response networks that were 
stable in size across equivalent time slices. First, we assumed that the organizations did not 
enter a response network, but rather, they were always present in the network and became 
active when they started to interact with other organizations. Second, we assumed that 
organizations did not leave the response networks, but rather, they maintained a presence 
throughout the duration of the period under analysis. In line with these two assumptions, 
for all of the response networks, we used the total number of organizations detected in 
a network to normalize the number of nodes contained in each network’s daily matrices. 
Third, we assumed that the appropriate window of analysis for the investigation of structural 
change was twenty-four hours. This decision was driven by the nature of newspaper 
reporting, but also because larger time slices would undermine our ability to determine if, 
and when, structural changes might have occurred. Finally, we assumed that the detection 
of an interaction between two or more organizations represented the establishment of a 
permanent relationship that lasted throughout the duration of the disaster response. To 
capture this representation, we created our daily meta-matrices on a cumulative basis. As 
such, matrix one represented the interactions detected in day one, matrix two represented 
the interaction detected in day one and day two, and matrix three represented the 
interactions detected in day one, day two, and day three. This process continued until the 
creation of the final matrix, which represented the disaster response network in its entirety.
Findings 
The findings indicate that the disaster response networks that operated after four hurricane 
events, Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana and Hurricane Rita in Texas in 2005 and Hurricane 
Gustav in Louisiana and Hurricane Ike in Texas in 2008, were comprised of a heterogeneous 
collection of response organizations. Additionally, these organizations modified their 
behaviors, at least in terms of their inter-organizational interaction patterns, which may 
suggest that these networks underwent the adaptive processes needed to overcome the 
uncertainties and complexities present in the post-disaster environment. However, as the 
findings presented below indicate, the characteristics of these four response networks were 
not identical.
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System Composition 
We began our analysis by generating frequency statistics that revealed the number and 
nature of the organizations that participated in the four response networks. In terms of 
numbers of organizational participants in the Louisiana networks, the data indicate that the 
Katrina response network was larger than the Gustav response network, at 372 and 222 
organizations respectively. In Texas, the situation was reversed, with more organizations 
participating in the Ike response network than in the Rita response network, at 372 and 
214 organizations respectively. This result is likely because Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Ike were the biggest storm events under analysis. Further exploration of the data revealed 
that each response network depended on contributions of organizations from multiple 
levels of jurisdiction. Reflecting the idea that all disasters are local, the organizations from 
jurisdictions classified as county/parish level or lower were the most represented in all four 
response networks: Katrina (172 or 46.24%); Gustav (117 or 52.70%); Rita (113 or 53.24%); and 
Ike (235 or 63.17%). The organizations from jurisdictions classified as federal and national, 
which included both government agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private businesses 
were the second most represented in the response networks: Katrina (94 or 27.27%); 
Gustav (52 or 23.42%); Rita (44 or 20.37%); and Ike (84 or 22.58%). This was followed by 
the organizations from jurisdictions classified as state and regional: Katrina (79 or 21.24%); 
Gustav (48 or 21.62%); Rita (42 or 19.44%); and Ike (42 or 11.29%).
Table 1. Organizational Composition of Hurricane Response Networks by Source of Funding
  LOUISIANA TEXAS
  Katrina Gustav Rita Ike
  N % N % N % N %
Nonprofit 61 16.40 42 18.92 36 16.82 98 26.34
Private 77 20.70 41 18.47 29 13.55 55 14.78
Public 234 62.90 139 62.61 149 69.63 219 58.87
Totals 372 100 222 100 214 100 372 100
Analysis of the organizational data by source of funding revealed similar findings. As Table 
1 indicates, public organizations played a substantial role in response activities following 
each disaster event. More specifically, these data indicate that approximately 60% of 
the organizations detected interacting within all four response networks were public 
organizations. The other sectors also made important contributions to the response networks, 
but depending on the state, their participation reported slightly different numbers. Although 
there were fewer total organizations detected in the Gustav network than in the Katrina 
network, the Gustav network contained a higher percentage of nonprofit organizations 
than did the Katrina network, at 18.92% and 16.40% respectively. The opposite occurred in 
Texas, where both the number and percentage of nonprofit organizations increased from 
Hurricane Rita to Hurricane Ike. Further, in comparison to the other three hurricanes, more 
nonprofit organizations reported interacting in the response network that formed after 
Ike, at 26.34%, than in any other network. These data indicate that all four networks were 
comprised of a heterogeneous collection of organizations, necessary to promote adaptation 
in response to complexity and uncertainty.
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System Growth and Development 
We continued analysis of the response networks by plotting the date that each organization 
became active, meaning that an organization began to interact with one or more organizations 
in the network. Figure 1 presents the comparative results for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Gustav. These data indicate that both networks experienced steady growth over time.
Figure 1. Cumulative Percentage of Newly Active Organizations Detected in Response 
Network by Day: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav
For both the Katrina and Gustav response networks, one quarter of the identified 
organizations were active by landfall. After landfall, the organizations in the Gustav 
network, as a percentage of all identified organizations, became active more quickly than 
the organizations in the Katrina network. By means of comparison, in the Gustav network, 
75.7% of organizations were active six days after landfall. At that same time, only 60.5% of 
the organizations were active in the Katrina network. Subsequently, the organizations in the 
Gustav network continued to become active at a faster rate, allowing the network to reach 
100% capacity sixteen days after landfall. In contrast, the Katrina response network did not 
reach 100% capacity until twenty days after landfall.
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 Article 9 (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Haase, Ertan & Comfort,  The Roots of Community Resilience  12
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Percentage of Newly Active Organizations Identified in Response 
Network by Day: Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike
Figure 2 presents the comparative results for Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike. These data 
indicate that both response networks also experienced steady growth over time. Unlike 
the Louisiana response networks, however, there were marked differences in the activation 
rates in the Texas response networks. For example, when Hurricane Rita made landfall, 
approximately three weeks after Hurricane Katrina, 39.9% of all organizations identified 
in the Rita network were active. Three years later, when Hurricane Ike made landfall, only 
12.6% of the organizations in the response network were active, a substantial drop from 
the findings for the Rita response network. The expansion of the Ike response network 
also proceeded at a slower rate, with 61.3% of the identified organizations active thirteen 
days after landfall, and all identified organizations active in the network nine days later. In 
contrast, 57.5% of the organizations identified in the Rita response network were active four 
days after the hurricane came ashore.
System Structural Evolution Over Time
We generated social network measures for the four response networks for each date 
included in this study. For this article, we investigated two common network measures: 
density and degree centralization. Wasserman and Faust define network density as the 
“proportion of the possible [links] that are actually present in a [network].”47 In contrast, 
degree centralization evaluated the extent to which actors have links to each of the other 
actors in the network. When applied to the network, the degree centrality measure is a 
quantification of the “range or variability of the individual actor’s indices.”48
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Network Density 
The network density scores for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav plotted over time 
are presented below in Figure 3. These results indicate that the overall density scores for 
both response networks were low, which is a common feature of large networks. Over time, 
however, the organizations in both networks became increasingly active. A closer look at 
the data reveals that the densities of the response networks began to diverge after the 
hurricanes came ashore. For the Katrina network, the density increased from 0.000884 
at landfall to 0.007695 twenty-two days later. In contrast, for the Gustav network, density 
increased to 0.005585 five days after landfall. Then, on the sixth day, the network’s density 
increased substantially to 0.011088, after which density gradually increased to 0.014879. On 
the day that this substantial jump in density occurred, FEMA was working with several state 
and parish organizations to open a major aid center, which began to distribute assistance to 
communities affected by Hurricane Gustav.
Figure 3: Comparison of Response Network Density by Day: Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Gustav
The network density scores for Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Ike plotted over time are 
presented in Figure 4. Like the response networks in Louisiana, the overall density scores for 
the response networks in Texas were also low. For the Rita network, response organizations 
began to establish linkages with one another at least four days before landfall. By September 
24, 2005, the density of the Rita network had reached 0.002633, which was the highest 
landfall density of all response networks. In contrast, on the day of landfall, the density of 
the Ike network was 0.000551, which was the lowest density of all response networks. The 
Rita data also indicate that six days after landfall, the density of the network increased from 
0.004475 to 0.006055. On this date, Texas counties were operating supply stations, crews 
were working to remove debris from the streets and to restore electrical services, and FEMA 
opened a disaster recovery center. From a comparative basis, however, these data suggest 
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that the capacity of response organizations to become active decreased in the three years 
that followed Hurricane Rita.
Figure 4: Comparison of Response Network Density by Day: Hurricane Rita and Hurricane 
Ike
Network Degree Centralization 
For the next step in our structural analysis, we calculated network degree centralization 
statistics for each of the hurricane response networks. Figure 5 reports the network 
degree centralization scores for Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav plotted over time. 
These data indicate that the organizations in both response networks gradually became 
increasingly connected to one another. At the time of landfall, both the Katrina network and 
the Gustav network were similar in structure. The Katrina network, however, was slightly 
more centralized than the Gustav network, at 0.039761 and 0.030728 respectively. The next 
day, the Gustav network became more centralized than the Katrina network, a finding that 
would remain constant over the next twenty-one days. 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Response Network Degree Centralization by Day: Hurricane Katrina 
and Hurricane Gustav
These data also reveal two points of structural change within these response networks. For 
the Rita network, the point of structural change occurred twelve days after landfall, when 
the network’s degree centralization score increased from 0.052306 to 0.108327. This finding 
parallels the density finding discussed in the previous subsection of this article. A point of 
structural change occurred much earlier in the Gustav network, on day six, when the degree 
centralization score increased from 0.067421 to 0.207980. On this day, there were multiple 
interactions exchanged between response organizations. These interactions reflected the 
collective response of city, county and state firefighters to fight fires in Terrebonne Parish, 
the Louisiana Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness working 
with state and local officials to establish and manage aid centers, and agencies such as FEMA 
and the Louisiana Department of Social Services working to provide food and social services 
to aid centers and citizens.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Response Network Degree Centralization by Day: Hurricane Rita 
and Hurricane Ike
Finally, the network degree centralization scores for the Rita and Ike response networks, 
plotted longitudinally, are presented in Figure 6. Like the Katrina and Gustav networks, these 
data indicate that the organizations in both Texas response networks became increasingly 
connected. When Hurricane Rita came ashore, the storm’s response network centralization 
score was 0.018416. Twelve days later, the network’s centralization score reached 0.093897, 
its maximum level. In contrast, the Ike response network, which had a centralization score 
of 0.018416 when the storm came ashore, rapidly increased to 0.095680 three days later. 
Perhaps due to the size of the storm, the Ike network’s centralization score continued to 
increase over the next few days, reaching 0.167801 nineteen days after landfall. From a 
comparative basis, the data presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 suggest that the organizations 
in all four response networks structured their interactions in a way that generated increasing 
levels of centralization, but once  a certain centralization threshold level was reached, the 
centralization processes began to stabilize. 
Investments in Training and Technology Post-2005
For the final stage of our analysis, we reviewed disaster policy changes that occurred after 
2005.49 At the federal level, Congress strengthened the capacity of the federal government’s 
disaster management system. In reaction to problems encountered after Hurricane Katrina, 
legislation such as the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 [Reform Act] 
reorganized the country’s disaster management institutions, strengthened and expanded 
the collection and dissemination of information, and reinforced communication and 
coordination capacities.50 The Reform Act also created the National Integration Center, which 
was charged to strengthen disaster management training and to promote collaboration 
among public, private, and non-profit organizations. Finally, the Reform Act required the 
Department of Homeland Security to modify its National Emergency Communications Plan so 
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that officials and disaster responders had the ability to communicate with one another after 
a disaster event.51
In Louisiana, the legislature amended the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act (Disaster Act) in 2006.52 In doing so, the legislature modified 
the state’s disaster management institutions, thereby improving their capacity to manage 
disaster events. The Disaster Act directed the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) to provide disaster management training and support 
throughout the state. The Disaster Act also established the state’s Emergency Operations 
Center, which coordinates the state’s emergency management operations. The Emergency 
Operation Center also assists local jurisdictions to coordinate response activities with their 
public, private and non-profit partners. Furthermore, the Louisiana legislature required the 
state’s parishes to develop emergency response plans and directed GOHSEP to provide 
technical assistance to parish authorities to help them to develop these plans.53 Finally, 
Louisiana spent more than US$180 million to strengthen the Louisiana Wireless Information 
Network (LWIN).54 Managed by GOHSEP and used by approximately 80,000 public and 
nonprofit personnel, the LWIN communication system can integrate with the communication 
networks used by neighboring states and maintain continuous communications in areas 
affected by disaster.
Finally, in Texas, the legislature also took steps to strengthen the state’s disaster management 
capacities. These changes, which were not adopted until 2007 because the Texas legislature 
convenes on a bi-annual basis, were made to the Texas Disaster Act of 1975. These amendments 
required that all public officials receive at least three hours of disaster management training 
before they assume their duties. The amendments also mandated that the Emergency 
Management Director be the presiding officer of the governing body of a city or country. 
Finally, the amendments established the Texas Statewide Mutual Aid system, which sets 
the conditions under which local governments may assist each other without a written 
agreement. Like Louisiana, Texas communities sought to improve their disaster management 
capacities. Communities like Houston upgraded their communications systems, conducted 
training, and disseminated information to the public. Despite such investments, the state 
of Texas reported that, three years after Hurricane Ike, its public safety communications 
shortcomings had yet to be addressed.55
Discussion
The findings generated by this study support the theoretical propositions that framed 
the analysis presented in this article. Our first proposition stated that a resilient disaster 
response network is comprised of a heterogeneous collection of organizations that interact 
with one another to pursue and obtain collective goals. This proposition is supported by 
the data presented in Tables 1 and 2. These tables indicate that public sector organizations 
from jurisdictions classified as county/parish or lower were the most prevalent in all four 
response networks. This finding not only reflects the idea that local agencies and officials 
are best positioned to respond to a disaster event, it also reflects the idea that communities 
in the United States expect their governments to deliver response assistance after a 
disaster. Moreover, these data indicate that federal and state organizations contributed 
to the response networks, often as coordinators or as the distributors of resources. More 
broadly, these data also indicate that private and nonprofit organizations participated in 
the response networks, bringing with them their resources and experience. Although their 
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participation was documented in different numbers, organizations from these sectors 
represented between 13% and 24% of all organizations identified in each response network. 
In the Rita network, for example, nonprofit organizations represented 16.65% of all identified 
organizations. In the Ike network, however, they represented 26.34% of the detected 
organizations. Despite these differences, which appear to be influenced by the scale of the 
disasters, the organizations identified in all four response networks had the potential to use 
each other to locate information, money, personnel and equipment, and if a relationship 
was established, to move these resources to where they were needed. 
Proposition 2 asserted that a resilient disaster response network can adapt its structure 
in response to the uncertainties and complexities present in the changing operational 
environment. In terms of adaptation as measured by network growth, the data presented 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate that all four response networks experienced steady 
growth over time. For example, in Louisiana, approximately 25% of all organizations that 
were active by the date of landfall for both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Gustav. After 
landfall, the organizations in the Gustav network became active more quickly than those 
in the Katrina network. In Texas, the data suggest that the opposite occurred, as the 2008 
response network, which formed after Hurricane Ike, became active more slowly than the 
2005 response network, which formed after Hurricane Rita. In terms of network structure, 
the findings presented in Figures 3 through 6 also indicate that all four response networks 
underwent change. Perhaps the best example of structural change occurred in the Gustav 
response network, when six days after landfall, the degree centralization score increased 
from 0.067421 to 0.207980, a result of an increase in reported organizational interactions 
related to firefighting, the management of aid centers, and the distribution of relief resources. 
An additional finding, reported in Figure 4, is the identification of points of structural change 
in the later stages of the Rita and Ike response networks, which may represent the system 
shifting from the response phase to the recovery phase. If so, this finding supports the 
transitions documented in the response and recover processes that occur after disaster 
events in large urban areas.56
The final proposition stated that information communication technologies (ICT), properly 
designed and implemented, facilitate the resilience of disaster response networks. The 
review of policy changes and investments in information technology revealed that steps 
taken at the federal level, and in the state of Louisiana, likely strengthened disaster resilience. 
At the federal level, Congress adopted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
of 2006, which reorganized the country’s disaster management institutions, strengthened 
disaster management training, promoted organizational collaboration, and required the 
Department of Homeland Security to modify its National Emergency Communications Plan. 
In Louisiana, the legislature amended the state’s Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency 
Assistance and Disaster Act in 2006. In doing so, the state directed GOHSEP to expand access 
to disaster management training, established the state’s Emergency Operations Center, 
and required the state’s parishes to develop emergency response plans. Central to these 
efforts was Louisiana’s decision to strengthen the Louisiana Wireless Information Network, 
the system used to maintain communications in disaster areas. In contrast, although the 
Texas legislature did adopt disaster management legislation, the changes were minor, and 
many did not come into effect until the later part of 2007, leaving little time for officials to 
implement these changes before the arrival of Hurricane Ike. Equally important, despite 
recognizing that it needed to strengthen its communication infrastructure, Texas as a state 
did not appear to take sufficient action prior to the arrival of Hurricane Ike. 
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Viewed collectively, all four disaster response networks demonstrated structural change. 
These structural changes, however, did not occur at the same rate nor did they evolve in the 
same manner, which suggests that each response network sought to find the appropriate 
“fit” for the context in which it operated. While all four networks were activated in response 
to different events, these findings suggest that Louisiana managed to strengthen the 
capacities and processes that generate resilience. Although these findings are subject to 
further inquiry, they indicate why the organizational response to Hurricane Gustav was 
more robust than the organizational response to Hurricane Katrina. In contrast, in Texas, 
the results generated for the Rita response network suggest that the network was likely 
influenced by the observed consequences from Hurricane Katrina three weeks earlier, 
an event that reinforced the need for preparedness and response throughout Texas. As 
the memory of Hurricane Katrina began to fade, and in line with the consensus that the 
response to Rita was constrained by shortcomings in evacuation processes, Texas did not 
take substantial steps to improve its disaster response capacities after 2005. Consequently, 
the level of resilience dropped over the course of three years, which may explain the slower 
response of the Ike network in 2008, in comparison to the Rita response network. 
Conclusions 
In the context of disaster response networks, resilience represents a set of adaptive 
capacities and a set of adaptive processes. Tied together in a series of feedback loops that 
facilitate learning, these capacities and processes provide the organizations in a disaster 
response network the ability to overcome the uncertainties and complexities present in 
the post-disaster environment through adaptation and change. The findings from this 
analysis demonstrate that disaster response networks undergo structural change, as 
a large heterogeneous collection of response organizations come together, collect and 
disseminate information, and seek to identify and implement solutions to address rapidly 
the needs of those affected by the disaster event. Although each of the response networks 
analyzed–Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav in Louisiana and Hurricanes Rita and Ike in Texas 
– experienced structural change, the rate at which these changes occurred differed in each 
network. A review of the policy changes and investments in information technology made in 
Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina, in contrast to those undertaken in Texas, suggests why 
the Hurricane Gustav response network was more robust than the Hurricane Ike response 
network. The findings support the well-established proposition that sustained investments 
in information technology infrastructure support the development of resilience in disaster 
response networks. 
For the organizations and government officials responsible for protecting the United States 
from the consequences of terrorist attacks, technological disasters, and catastrophic 
natural events, the challenge is to determine how to reduce risk in an environment that 
is becoming increasingly interdependent and risk prone. As we advance further into the 
twenty-first century, risk reduction efforts will become more difficult, as policy-makers seek 
the means to manage the effects of urbanization, population growth, environmental change, 
and technological advancement. The promotion of resilience in disaster response networks 
may provide communities with a cost-effective tool that could be used to manage the 
consequences of a variety of risks. This means that, from a public policy perspective, federal, 
state and local governments should continue to update their institutional arrangements to 
facilitate administrative flexibility, organizational collaboration and cooperation, and the use 
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of technology to share information across a heterogeneous community of organizations, 
decision-makers, and individual citizens.57 
In addition to strengthening administrative capacities within the United States, it is essential 
to develop a conceptual framework that outlines the parameters of network resilience for 
disaster response organizations.  This framework needs to identify factors that promote 
adaptive capacity in disaster response networks, as well as indicators that facilitate the 
measurement and assessment of network resilience. As the findings from this study 
suggest, the components and indicators of network resilience likely relate to the design 
of institutional arrangements, use of information technology, development of coordination 
plans and mutual aid agreements, and systematic use of disaster management training. 
To increase network performance, it is essential to evaluate whether public investments 
for disaster preparedness and response operations are producing the expected results. 
Although the concept of resilience does not provide a set of actionable solutions for 
communities exposed to recurring risk, such investigations contribute to more informed 
administrative adaptation.58
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Homeland Security is strategically defined as an enterprise based on a concerted national 
effort: a nation-wide comprehensive activity, including all of government across federal, 
state, local, territorial and tribal tiers; the public and the private sector; and the whole 
community of first responders and vigilant citizens. While Homeland Security in addition 
to government agencies and the private sector counts on each single citizen as part of the 
whole-community approach, little is known about how it actually resonates with citizens. In 
fall 2016, as part of a representative phone poll (the Penn State Omnibus Poll), Pennsylvania 
residents’ perception of Homeland Security was assessed. 
How Citizens Define Homeland Security
A clear majority of Pennsylvanians (65%) define Homeland Security as something of positive 
value that provides needed protection to U.S. citizens. This matches nation-wide poll data on 
citizens’ approval ratings of the Department of Homeland Security. Only a minority (7%) see 
it as something negative, citing surveillance and infringement of liberty, huge bureaucracy, or 
waste of taxpayers’ money as reasons. Not a lot of Pennsylvanians are aware that Homeland 
Security actually transcends the federal level of government.
What Homeland Security Protects From
Not many but at least 16% of Pennsylvanians are aware of the all-hazards approach to 
Homeland Security and that its mission space extends beyond preventing terrorism. There 
are in fact five Homeland Security core missions. The founding core mission of Homeland 
Security, “Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security” is cited by more than a third (37%) 
of Pennsylvanians. Not as much awareness exists for the other four core missions. In any 
case, 12% cite the core mission of “Securing and Managing Our Borders,” whereas only 
4% refer to the core mission of “Enforcing and Immigration Laws.” That “Safeguarding and 
Securing Cyberspace” and “Ensuring Resilience to Disaster” are Homeland Security core 
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missions is largely unknown to Pennsylvanians. Yet nearly a quarter (23%) see an additional 
main mission in Homeland Security: Ensuring general safety, wellbeing of the people, and 
protection from violence as such.
Who Provides Homeland Security 
The majority of Pennsylvanians (63%) see Homeland Security provided for by the federal 
government. At the same time, 17% recognize that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is 
involved in providing Homeland Security to the citizens. The concept of the whole-community 
approach only has reached a few: Just 1% refer to collaboration among several actors beyond 
the federal government, and those who do most often cite police as an example, followed 
by airlines.
How Homeland Security Affects Daily Life
Potentially, Homeland Security affects or even involves citizens on a daily basis. Examples 
would be suspicious activity reporting, as encouraged through the “If You See Something, 
Say Something” campaign, cyber security awareness, or active shooter preparedness. 
Most Pennsylvanians (70%) yet are not sure about the effect of Homeland Security on their 
daily lives. However, almost a quarter (23%) feel Homeland Security to affect their daily 
lives – such as by ensuring safe and secure neighborhoods; via the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) when travelling on a plane, through security precautions in public 
transportation; or by encouragement to report suspicious activity.  
Conclusion and Recommendations
Pennsylvanians appreciate homeland security as something that the country does to protect 
the American way of life and the safety of American citizens. No more than a few are aware 
that they themselves, as citizens, are part of the Homeland Security Enterprise.  Increased 
citizen-involvement campaigns are needed, and should be placed within a common 
framework to increase homeland security recognition consistent with the whole-community 
approach. National campaigns such as “See Something, Say Something,” State campaigns 
such as “Ready.pa,” and sector-specific safety and security campaigns such as for example 
in the public transportation sector should be candidates for visible co-branding with U.S. 
Homeland Security to place them into a strategic citizen-involving context. Further, as we 
are moving towards the 2018 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, a bottom-up review 
perspective should be included that addresses State-level information, such as empirical 
analysis of citizens’ risk perception, understanding of, and expectations in the Homeland 
Security Enterprise.  
Alexander Seidschlag may be reached at aus50@psu.edu 
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Mass Migration and the Media: 
Convergence and Divergence of 
Global Media Narratives Towards 
a Working Model
by Emily Damm, Amy Jones, Skye Cooley, and Elizabeth Roshelli
The size and scope of the Syrian refugee crisis has made it a salient humanitarian crisis for the 
international community that has given rise to fears among European and U.S. populations 
and leaders, altered the demographic landscape of the Middle East and Europe, and exposed 
a generation of youth to lives as exiles. Our quantitative, inductive content analysis analyzed 
news media coverage of refugees from Arabic, Russian, and American media news sources 
in an attempt to understand how the crisis has been packaged and presented to citizens 
across the globe in order to give insight to the motives and potential actions to be taken 
by the global community concerning the crisis. The study was conducted using the M3S 
media monitoring system at Texas A&M University. The M3S technology allows researchers 
to evaluate foreign language news broadcast and media websites in the original context 
with validated English language translations.
The authors evaluated Al Jazeera (Arabic), Rossiya 24 (Russian), and The New York Times (U.S) 
as sources for analysis. The research was conducted within the timeframe of August 5 to 
21, 2016, as that time spanned the 2016 Olympics in Rio, Brazil, in which the creation of the 
Olympic Refugee team caused a spike in media discussion of the refugee crisis. A total of 193 
articles were coded across the three news sources using the keyword “Refugee.” Researchers 
developed a coding scheme of ten categories designed to give insight into presentation of 
refugees in media [see table1.]. The coded data was then evaluated for statistical significance 
between the news sources.
The findings showed the three media outlets to be apathetic towards refugees, with no 
attempt at humanizing those affected by the crisis. Little discussion was given to physical, 
educational, and/or psychological harm being done to refugees. The media outlets also gave 
very few opportunities for the refugees to speak in their own voice, and instead crafted 
stories around them as a mass entity. Media outlets were more likely to place blame on 
other governments for the crisis, rather than calling for or seeking an international political 
solution; none of the media outlets discussed solutions to the crisis as urgently needed. A 
few mentions of successful assimilation were given, typically in reference to the refugee 
athletes in the Olympics.
Rossiya 24 gave no mention of a political solution for the crisis and had the highest number 
of stories dehumanizing refugees; specifically relating refugees to acts of terrorism, crime, 
and an overall threat to Russian culture. Of particular note, the Russian media source was 
most likely to call for humanitarian aid from other nations to address the crisis.
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Al Jazeera mentioned the mistreatment of refugees, discussed the crisis as a political event, 
and made calls for a solution in Syria more than any other source. Most often these stories 
focused on the impact refugees had on neighboring countries, researchers speculate this 
focus is due to the proximity of the crisis compared to the other media sources.
The New York Times focused on the crisis as a “foreign” event with little threat to U.S. culture. 
These stories typically made calls for US citizens to be accepting of refugees and had 
the highest number of stories with a humanizing component for refugees. The New York 
Times had the least number of stories calling for humanitarian aid or mention of refugee 
mistreatment.
While the findings were limited by the selected news outlets studied and narrow time frame, 
the snapshot of coverage offers insight toward the refugee crisis and demonstrates the 
ability of new technology that allow social scientist to monitor media message movements 
through global media. Such applications can allow for the modeling of global media and 
pave the way for new media theories. The lead author may be reached at emilybelledamm@
gmail.com .
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The State of Science Regarding 
Membership in Terrorist 
Organizations and Perpetration of 
Terrorist Attacks
by Sarah L. Desmarais, Joseph Simons-Rudolph,  
Christine Shahan Brugh, Eileen Schilling, & Chad Hoggan 
North Carolina State University
Background
One strategy in the fight against terrorism involves identifying individuals who are at 
heightened risk of joining terrorist organizations or perpetrating terrorist attacks. Success 
of this counterterrorism strategy will depend upon knowledge of the factors that increase 
risk for these outcomes. To date, the intelligence community has a served as a primary 
source of information on terrorist organizations and activity. However, hundreds of scientific 
papers have been written on the topic and may offer important insights into risk factors for 
terrorism. These largely academic endeavors have been diverse in their foci, approach, and 
findings. As such, there is a need to summarize the state of science regarding membership 
in terrorist organizations and perpetration of terrorist attacks towards the goal of informing 
counterterrorism strategy.
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to conduct a systematic review of the published and 
unpublished scientific literature regarding factors associated with joining terrorist 
organizations or perpetrating terrorist attacks. Our primary research aims were to: 1) 
describe the characteristics of the scientific literature on risk factors for terrorism; and 
2) to identify individual and environmental factors that are associated with membership 
in terrorist organizations and perpetration of terrorist attacks. We additionally explored 
the evidence supporting factors associated with the process of radicalization, including 
motivation and process.
Methods
Records were identified through searches of six abstracting and indexing databases using 
the following combinations of search terms: (a) terror* member*, (b) terror* affiliat*, (c) 
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terror* radical*, and (d) predict* terror*. Inclusion criteria were: (a) discussed the prediction 
of terrorism; addressed variables related to joining terrorist organizations or perpetrating 
terrorist attacks; reported in peer-review journals, dissertations, theses, conference 
presentations, government reports, or book chapters; (d) written in English (or reliable 
translation); and (e) produced between 1990 and 2015. We reviewed the reference sections 
of articles selected for inclusion for records that were not identified through these search 
strategies. In total, 205 articles met our inclusion criteria. Articles were coded by two 
researchers using a coding scheme; a subset of 19 articles were coded by both to establish 
inter-rater agreement.
Overview of Findings
Findings of our systematic review revealed a growth in scientific interest in terrorism over 
time: more than three-quarters of the articles were produced in the last 10 years. More than 
half were produced by authors in the United States. Across various aspects of terrorism 
(such as ideology, specific organizations, types of terrorists, or types of attacks), articles 
rarely specified the focus of their investigation. Instead, articles often treated terrorism as 
one unitary or homogenous construct. Most articles discussed theoretical perspectives, 
critiques, or case studies. The vast majority (81%) cited findings reported in other articles 
as their data source. There were just 50 articles that presented results of new empirical 
research.
Results of the 50 empirical articles were most frequently descriptive in nature, presenting 
the frequencies of various characteristics amongst a group of known terrorists. A handful 
of articles statistically compared characteristics between known groups of terrorists; for 
instance, comparing level of education or prevalence of criminal histories amongst one group 
of terrorists versus another. Only six articles presented findings of statistical comparisons 
between a group of known terrorists and a group of non-terrorists. As a result, empirical 
evidence of variables that discriminate between terrorists and non-terrorists is limited.
Analysis of the results reported in the empirical articles revealed nine variables with 
at least some evidence supporting for their relevance to terrorism. These include: age, 
socioeconomic status, prior arrest, education, employment, relationship status, having a 
grievance (political or personal), specific geographic region, and type of geographic area 
(i.e., urban or rural). Young age, low socioeconomic status, at least high school education, 
and unemployment showed statistically significant associations with terrorism outcomes 
when comparisons were conducted between known terrorists and non-terrorists. Findings 
also suggest that a triggering event, such as a major personal loss, may act as the impetus 
for radicalization. Additional individual characteristics, including country of birth, being 
Muslim, military experience, foreign travel history, family or friend in a terrorist or extremist 
organization, and environmental characteristics, including income inequality, and media 
and government influences, were prevalent among the samples of known terrorists and 
merit further investigation as potential risk factors. Given the limitations of the research, 
however, there is not enough empirical evidence to conclude that any of these variables are 
indeed risk factors for terrorism.
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Recommendations
Findings of our review have implications for research and counterterrorism strategy. With 
respect to research, the small number of comparison studies is a critical limitation of the 
scientific literature. For a certain characteristic to be established as a risk factor for terrorism, 
it must be shown that the characteristic is statistically associated with terrorism and that it 
precedes (temporally) terrorist activity. It is only possible to show this statistical association 
through longitudinal studies that compare characteristics of terrorists and non-terrorists. 
As such, the conduct of comparative studies of individuals or groups over time is an urgent 
direction for future research. Further, articles typically focused on the independent effects of 
individual or environmental factors; yet, risk for terrorism most likely reflects an interaction 
of factors within and across these levels. We also were limited to examination of findings 
reported in the scientific literature to date. As new terrorist organizations emerge, there 
will be a need to revisit the relevance of established and refuted risk factors to these new 
threats.
With respect to counterterrorism strategy, our findings suggest that some presumed risk 
factors are not related to terrorism at all or in the anticipated direction. Take country of 
birth, for example; the one statistical comparison found that homegrown terrorists were 
more likely to be born in the United States than were their non-terrorist counterparts. Thus, 
domestic (as opposed to foreign) country of birth appears to be a risk factor for terrorism. 
Several other characteristics, such as religious conversion, being Muslim, and foreign 
travel history, were not statistically associated with terrorism outcomes, when examined. 
Counterterrorism strategies focused on these presumed risk factors are likely to be 
ineffective. Focusing on these factors also may increase risk for terrorism by contributing to 
a sense of persecution or discrimination that may (further) radicalize the individual or group 
and ‘justify’ terrorist activity. Finally, counterterrorism strategy that focuses on the presence 
of certain risk factors in and of themselves is likely to be of limited value without information 
on the social or political context and vice versa. To demonstrate, focusing on young age, 
male gender, and being single as risk factors for terrorism will not help discriminate amongst 
a pool of potential targets who are all young, single men.  The lead author may be reached 
at sdesmarais@ncsu.edu .
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Preparing for the Next Mass 
Migration: Lessons from the Past 
and Recommendations for the 
Future
by Dr. R. B. Watts
In 1995 over 60,000 migrants from both Haiti and Cuba attempted to reach the United 
States through maritime means, primarily vastly overcrowded sailboats and rafts. While it 
is unclear how many died in the attempt to reach the United States, the vast number were 
rescued via a huge inter-agency effort led by the Coast Guard and Navy.  In 2006, it was 
feared that a migration on this scale was imminent due to failing health of President Castro. 
But much had changed since the 1990s; the strategic migration plan—Operation Vigilant 
Sentry—did not reflect the formation of DHS or the massive organizational and interagency 
shift that had occurred since 9/11.  After an extensive inter-agency planning effort, the 
strategy was updated to reflect the new operational reality; fortunately, the threat of a new 
mass migration subsided.
Ten years later, the problem of maritime migration not only remains likely in our hemisphere 
due to political and economic unrest in South and Central America, but is also becoming a 
global phenomenon.
The History
Maritime migration has always been a consistent, global historical norm.  This is perfectly 
understandable; the sea is the great global highway, and transport of goods and people on 
the sea is universal. The United States has experienced three mass migrations in the past 30 
years, the size and scope of which are indicative of the problem; almost 200,000 migrants 
were rescued. Strategically, these events shared a number of common characteristics. Each 
was predicated by a significant political event, either the change (or perceived) change of 
policy by national governments or potential host nations. In each, migrant groups en masse 
perceived an opportunity for exploitation. Although this perception was often false (such as 
the rumor that the U.S. was changing its stance on accepting migrants, a significant driver 
in Haiti in 1994), the result was still the same.  In general migrants were poor and almost 
completely ignorant or unaware of seafaring, creating an enormous safety of life at sea 
issue.
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The Lessons
The overwhelming number of lessons learned during the mass migrations of the 1990s 
focused on effective command and control and the rapid establishment of a strategic 
process that effectively handled each phase of the migrant process (interdiction, transport, 
disposition).  A centralized interagency command and control system, ideally at sea, was 
essential to migrant interdiction and rescue. This was effective in three areas:
Interdiction:  Strategic interdiction is all about getting as many afloat assets to the region 
as quickly as possible.  But simply “flooding” the area with assets wasn’t enough. During 
the Haitian and Cuban migrations this was conducted through the implementation of the 
“CTU” (Commander Task Unit) concept, a modification of the Navy Task Force model tailored 
for drug and migrant interdiction, an effective planning and execution organization for 
interagency support.
Transport: The number of people in danger and the speed required to rescue them often 
resulted in mass overloading; in one case, for example, a 270ft ship had well over 800 
migrants onboard before it was forced to leave the area.  This mass overloading was the 
norm rather than the exception. To address this, the CTU designated the largest afloat asset 
available—in this case, a Navy amphibious ship—to act as a roaming “bus” in the OpArea 
to load on migrants from rescue units who could then continue operations.  This tactic was 
subsequently institutionalized in the follow on migrant plan for 2006.
Disposition: The 1990s mass migrations relied on GTMO for the disposition of migrants; as 
noted, camps where migrants could be housed and fed until final status was determined. 
Logistically, this was an enormous effort, coordinated by the establishment of a Joint 
Task Force (JTF) specifically designed to house, feed, and provide medical care for tens of 
thousands of migrants.  This ultimately was a great success.  However, it should be noted 
that the establishment of facilities at GTMO was a political decision and by far the most 
important one in terms of long term success.
The Future
These lessons were ultimately updated in the new migrant plan, Operations Vigilant Sentry 
(OVS) in 2007.  But today, there are significant “game changers” that must be considered. 
These are primarily technological; in 1994 forces assigned for rescue and interdiction had 
the vast technological edge in the OpArea in terms of speed, mobility, and the ability to 
conduct command, control and communication. This is no longer the case. Today smugglers 
can coordinate with speed and sophistication previously undreamed of, including 
communication, navigation, and ability to control “battle rhythm through the internet.
Given the speed inherent in a mass migration and its potential scope, it is imperative that 
supply and training for a mass migration be part of the planning cycle and TTP (training, 
tactics and procedures) for today’s fleet of Coast Guard and Navy vessels.  Rescue of migrants 
is a dangerous operation, and transport of large numbers of migrants must be designed 
and practiced by each class of vessel. Vessels of all services must have a fundamental 
understanding of the mechanics of mass migration as it is highly likely that literally anything 
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that floats will be sent to the scene of disaster.  Readiness at the tactical level is key for 
overall success.
Ultimately, we must be familiar with our strategy and work to keep it current with modern 
trends. Predicting the future is, of course, the classic challenge for any strategist.  But 
analyzing the classic elements of mass migration can be of great benefit. We know that 
migration by sea is becoming increasingly common in areas of political instability.  We know 
that mass migration is often driven by rumor and conjecture, something that is easily spread 
through the internet.  And we know that, in general, most nations are willing to address it 
if there is a unifying goal of saving life at sea. This should be our focus. The author may be 
reached at WattsR3@ndu.edu .
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Community resilience can be created via small group practices to respond to emerging 
threats, like accidents, disasters and terrorist emergencies. My case study research shows 
that that innovation happens when people care and connect in small groups of 16 or fewer 
in life-threatening situations. This natural process I found is described as the five-step 
Heroic Improv Cycle (Alert, Ready, Connect, Focus and Move), which describes how people 
work together to respond to emerging threats. I developed a training program called Heroic 
Improv to help small groups practice the abilities they need for high-stakes crises in a low-
stakes practice. The Heroic Improv exercises are based on theater improvisation activities 
and have been tested with hundreds of participants in the U.S. and the Philippines.  The 
Heroic Improv program is time-efficient, inexpensive and effective to prepare communities 
for emerging threats. The author may be reached at dr.marytysz@ymail.com 
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Evaluating Federal Grant 
Programming to Support State 
and Local Critical Infrastructure 
Protection: Results and 
Perspectives of Qualitative-
Empirical End-User Survey 
Research in the EU
by Andrea Jerković
This paper presents the approach and main results of a series of surveys and foresight 
activities at Member State and EU levels to contribute to program evaluation and evolution 
by identifying end-user and practitioner technology and knowledge needs for improved 
critical infrastructure protection at state and local levels. The approach was first used in 
a study to support the Austrian Security Research Program KIRAS, launched in 2005 as 
the first Security Research Program in the EU, and then at the KIRAS grant project level. 
Subsequently, it was expanded on and used in European Union-co-funded Security Research 
projects. This included foresight projects such as FOCUS, where inter-project collaboration 
was established with DHS Science & Technology projects as well as with the FEMA Strategic 
Foresight Initiative.
Research has shown that homeland security can significantly benefit from actively seeking 
international best practices and an international scope on its mission space. While national 
specifics remain (such as the challenge of aged infrastructure in the U.S. and the EU focus 
on energy and transport sectors), main characteristics converge across the U.S. and the EU 
as well as its Member States, such as the private sector as the main owner of, and investor 
in, critical infrastructure. Both U.S. critical infrastructure and EU Member States National 
Critical Infrastructure (NCI) are commonly referred to as being to 85 percent in the hands 
of the private sector. Review and exchange of practices appear promising, in particular 
as the U.S. Homeland Security Enterprise and the EU’s move towards a genuine Security 
Union have specific challenges in common that include converging mission spaces, the 
distributed character of the effort, its reaching across different horizontal and vertical tiers 
of government, as well as the objective of a security community, where all parts of society 
should be involved in the production of security as a public good, and be able to consume it.
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In particular, federal programming in homeland and civil security should contribute to 
empowering actors at state and local levels to reach their mission goals, while fostering 
state and local ownership. Further, national risk management doctrine used to prioritize 
preparedness and response resources should consistently include risk assessment at state, 
local, territorial, and tribal levels, and systematically collect related expectations in homeland 
security policies and programs.
Overall, in order to effectuate federal grant programming in homeland and civil security 
(with a focus on critical infrastructure protection), the following steps should be considered:
• Increase state and local ownership in federal programs and national security problems;
• Address interaction of infrastructure and (political, civic, organizational, and security) 
culture more strongly and consistently; and
• Emphasize the value-added (or subsidiary) character of federal programs with regard to 
state and local initiatives.
Andrea Jerkovic may be reached at jerkovic@european-security.info
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The Light Under the Bushel — 
Redefining US National Security 
by Leveraging Principles of 
Human Security to Address 
Underlying Causes of Asymmetric 
Insurgencies
by Dr. Elisabeth Hope Murray, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University  
& Dr. Jim Ramsay, University of New Hampshire 
 
UAPI and Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
10th Anniversary Summit, George Mason Arlington Campus, 2017
The primary purposes of the American institutions of governance are to secure and protect 
the citizens of the state; the belief that our government has the will and ability to do so is one 
of the reasons citizens continue to believe in the greatness of America. However, current US 
national security strategies have struggled to protect individuals from the social, economic, 
and political chaos incited by the emergence of transnational (asymmetric) challenges such 
as terrorism and other macro-regional threats such as climate change. If our government 
is intent on preventing the development of the next radical group, such as Al-Qaeda, Al-
Shabaab, or ISIS, the national security dialogue, and consequently the next strategy, must 
directly and intentionally incorporate principles of human security.  Most insurgent groups 
have definitive, foundational links to human security crises: food insecurity, water insecurity, 
increasing fragile livelihoods, inadequate access to economic burden sharing, and limited 
resource availability.  The US is the global leader in military humanitarian relief and is the 
only military in the world that has formalized global relief efforts through a separate office: 
the office of Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA). OHDACA receives a 
separate annual budget allocation for three thematic windows: humanitarian mine action, 
humanitarian assistance, and foreign disaster relief, critical at a time where, from 2001 to 
2011, the annual average number of people affected by natural disasters has risen by 232%, 
compared to 1990 to 2000.  Similarly, increased attention is being paid in the US Military to 
the cost-benefit of policies supporting the prevention and mitigation of social and ideological 
radicalization.  We propose that human security principles be integrated more formally into 
the US national security strategy.
In light of the challenges posed by climate change and the lesser, but still crucial challenges 
posed by asymmetrical terrorism, we say with certainty that now more than ever before we 
need the full integration of a human security paradigm to emerge in tandem with the current 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 UAPI Summit Special Issue  (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Murray & Ramsay,  The Light Under the Bushel  2
national security sector present in American policy making. Strategic plans specifically 
identifying the non-linear nature of wicked threats need to be initiated as soon as possible 
in order to begin limiting the power of these threats on American security specifically and 
human security more generally. We believe the Department of Homeland Security to be in 
a unique position to provide the leadership and structure to institute such critical changes. 
With its dual focus on Emergency Management and Counter-terrorism, the foundational 
ideological and practical structures are already in place. These structures are critical, as 
without a structured, strategic approach to wicked security threats, a new American human 
security paradigm will fail. Our paper details specific areas where a greater focus on human 
security could relate directly to the increased security of the US state and its citizens.
Lead author Elizabeth Hope Murray may be reached at murraye4@erau.edu
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Improving Citizen Threat 
Preparedness & Recovery
by Robert Mandel
Within the homeland security context, this paper examines obstacles to effective mass 
participation, ways to enhance citizen accountability and vigilance in the face of threat, 
and value controversies embedded in this thrust.  The goal is to expand and refine existing 
techniques so as to improve citizen preparation and recovery regarding ominous human 
security dangers.  Although the quest to improve mass public involvement in its protection 
from internal and external threat is not new, there is considerable room for improvement.
The principal obstacles to citizen threat preparedness and recovery are paralyzing citizen 
fears, citizen protection measurement difficulties, and citizen safety misperceptions.  The 
ways to enhance citizen accountability and vigilance in the face of threat include wider 
adoption of a two-pronged top-down/bottom-up approach that directly involves both 
government and society; more integrated coordination is needed among relevant private 
and public players in the citizen protection game, improving incentives for cooperation and 
resolving public-private differences; and expanded citizens’ accountability, preparedness, 
and vigilance needed to increase (1) their post-disruption resiliency, (2) their government 
input quality, and (3) their personal safety measures.  The value controversies embedded in 
this thrust include finding ways to restore mutual state-society trust, to minimize tradeoffs 
between human security and state security, to raise the priority of public safety concerns, 
and to promote stabilizing civil society norms.  While these recommendations may seem 
familiar, new ways of pursuing these objectives (suggested in the paper) can improve both 
their effectiveness and legitimacy.
In reflecting on the relative importance of citizen protection, a dual danger exists of either 
overreacting or underreacting to homeland security threats.  The greatest challenge remains 
prioritizing properly what is most important to state and society.   The path to secure 
citizen protection entails considerable subtlety and sensitivity about diverse threats and 
responses, depending on security vulnerabilities, threat tolerance, compromise possibilities, 
risk propensities, physical and psychological resiliency, and value aspirations.  To improve 
threat responses, security officials need more creative, innovative, outside-the-box thinking. 
Delusions, misperceptions, miscommunications, inconsistent actions, and confounding 
paralysis about homeland security could be tolerable if the world’s citizens were universally 
experiencing robust safety, but such is not the case.
There is no viable alternative to beginning now to take concrete steps to improve citizen 
threat preparedness and recovery.  Despite extensive efforts in this direction since 9/11, we 
can certainly do better.  The individual security impact of anarchic violence on unhealthy 
lifestyles, personal damage vulnerability, civil society norm erosion, and lawlessness could, 
if left unchecked, so remove any sense of order that government would ultimately be utterly 
unable to function.  We citizens must get the ball rolling to advance our security by undertaking 
better monitoring of genuine dangers and vigilance about state threat responses, faster 
means to return to normal after shocks, and more effective independent state-coordinated 
initiatives to maximize our own safety. The author may be reached at mandel@lclark.edu .
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 13 UAPI Summit Special Issue  (October 2017) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
George, White, Chow & Boult,  Apples-to-Apples 1
Apples-to-Apples:  
LIRA vs. RAMCAP
by Randy George, Rick White, C. Edward Chow, and Terrance Boult
In October 2014, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate 
(DHS S&T) contracted the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS) to evaluate RAMCAP, 
the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection. RAMCAP was developed by 
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) at the request of the White House 
shortly after 9/11 to uniformly assess risk and help prioritize national investments in critical 
infrastructure protection. Despite four years working with stakeholders, RAMCAP was 
rejected after it was introduced in the 2006 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Among 
its few surviving applications, RAMCAP is designated the J100-10 standard for risk analysis 
on Water and Wastewater treatment plants. It was for this reason that DHS returned to 
RAMCAP in 2014 over concerns for the nation’s deteriorating drinking water infrastructure.
In the United States, about 156,000 public water systems provide drinking water to about 
320 million people through more than 700,000 miles of pipes. Unfortunately, much of the 
system is starting to come to the end of its useful life, with many of the pipes over 100 
years old. As a consequence, there are an estimated 240,000 water main breaks per year 
contributing to the estimated 1.7 trillion gallons of water lost to broken and leaky pipes. 
The cost to fix the system is estimated somewhere between $650 billion and $1 trillion.1 
Most water utilities are unprepared to take on this expense. The Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) doesn’t have the money,2 nor does Congress, having allocated only $17.3 billion 
to the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) over the past 20 years;3 [3] less than 3% 
needed to fix the problem based on the lowest estimate.
Leaky pipes are not the only concern. Climate change also poses a threat to the nation’s 
drinking water infrastructure. Higher air and water temperatures promote increased growth 
of algae and microbes, increasing the need for drinking water treatment. Higher air and 
water temperatures also melt the polar ice caps causing global sea levels to rise. Sea-level 
rise increases the salinity of both surface and ground water, resulting in salt-water intrusion 
into coastal drinking water supplies. Reduced annual precipitation and extended drought 
threaten in-land water supplies. Climate change presents yet another challenge for which 
utilities are unprepared to pay the bill.4
1 M. Morrow, “America’s Water Infrastructure Is in Need of a Major Overhaul,” FOX Business, 28 
January 2016. [Online]. Available: http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/01/28/america-s-water-
infrastructure-is-in-need-major-overhaul.html#. [Accessed 6 February 2016].
2 US Environmental Protection Agency, “EPA Response to EO 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity,” Washington, DC, 2014.
3 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “How the Drinking Water State Revolvong Fund Works,” 
[Online]. Available: http://www.epa.gov/drinkingwatersrf/how-drinking-water-state-revolving-fund-
works#tab-1. [Accessed 6 February 2016].
4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Climate Change Adaptation Plan,” Washington, DC, 2014.
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As if these concerns aren’t enough, water utilities also face the threat of terrorist attack. 9/11 
demonstrated the ability of small groups to inflict catastrophic destruction by subverting 
critical infrastructure. Water utilities are not just critical, they are considered a “lifeline” 
function; they are essential to the operation of most other critical infrastructure sectors. Water 
utilities are considered “lifeline” functions together with communications, transportation, 
and energy. Moreover, water utilities pose a potential target because about 15% of facilities 
provide services to more than 75% of the US population.5 A carefully executed cyber attack 
could conceivably disrupt the distribution systems for these supplies.
Concerned about these emerging threats to the nation’s drinking water from aging 
infrastructure, climate change, and cyber attack, in 2014 DHS S&T launched the Drinking 
Water Resilience Project (DWRP). Whenever faced with more tasks than resources, one 
must prioritize. DWRP sought an objective risk methodology to help prioritize national 
investments, not just in water utilities, but all lifeline infrastructures. DHS S&T tasked UCCS 
to evaluate RAMCAP for this capability.
Detailed analysis involving modeling and simulation determined that RAMCAP did not 
account for emerging threats from aging infrastructure, climate change, or cyber attack. 
Nor could RAMCAP account for mobile assets, leaving out the entire aviation subsector. 
Most significantly, RAMCAP allowed wide variability in its calculations, making the results 
incomparable across assets or sectors. Overcoming these shortfalls would require a major 
overhaul of RAMCAP. The first step was expanding RAMCAP’s reference scenarios to include 
the emerging threat categories. The second step was more drastic. To accommodate mobile 
assets, RAMCAP’s bottom-up component analysis had to be replaced with a top-down system 
analysis. And perhaps the greatest challenge, the third step was to outfit RAMCAP with a 
default database of threat and vulnerability values to eliminate variability so risk results 
could be compared “apples-to-apples”. To demonstrate the feasibility of these changes, 
UCCS developed a prototype model called LIRA for Lifeline Infrastructure Risk Analysis.
LIRA met the objectives set by DWRP. DHS S&T wanted to submit it for certification by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and help LIRA avoid the fate of RAMCAP. DHS 
S&T thus contracted UCCS a second year in October 2015 to develop the corresponding ANSI-
standard specification. As part of the process, UCCS was tasked to incorporate stakeholder 
feedback on the LIRA design. This was done through an online survey administered between 
February and May 2016.
The LIRA survey was comprised of ten “Would you rather…” questions. The questions were 
formulated to gauge user preferences between fundamental differences in LIRA and RAMCAP 
designs. LIRA trades detailed results for speed and cost savings. RAMCAP trades speed and 
cost savings for detailed results. At the conclusion of the survey, participants expressed 
an overwhelming preference for LIRA. Unfortunately, the results were convincing, but not 
conclusive. Despite reaching out to 684 representatives from the aviation, electricity, and 
drinking water subsectors, only 26 people responded to the survey. The confidence intervals 
were too large to make the results definitive. Before making a substantial investment in ANSI 
certification, DHS S&T wanted to confirm the results. Consequently, UCCS was contracted a 
third year in October 2016 to repeat the survey and also deliver a tool to help build the LIRA 
database.
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering for 
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” US Department of Homeland Secuirty, Washington, DC, 2013.
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Epilogue. Since this paper was submitted, UCCS completed its obligations under the DWRP 
Y3 contract. The survey was again under-represented, garnering only 49 more responses. 
This time, though, the results were mixed, favoring neither RAMCAP nor LIRA. The confusion 
may be attributable to a design flaw in the survey. It doesn’t matter. In August 2017, UCCS 
released the LIRA Database Validation Tool. LIRA-DVT is a complete online implementation 
of the LIRA risk methodology including a default data set. The purpose of LIRA-DVT is to 
collect locally-adjusted changes to the default database. The collected data is anonymous, 
and cannot be traced back to the user. A LIRA risk analysis can take less than thirty minutes. 
In addition to providing an objective assessment of risk at the local, state, and national 
levels, LIRA also helps users examine the cost benefits of alternative mitigation and resilience 
measures. LIRA-DVT is available for free at https://lira.uccs.edu/app/. Rick White may be 
reached at rwhite2@uccs.edu
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Online Human Behaviors on Social 
Media During Disaster Responses
by Jooho Kim and Makarand Hastak
Executive summary
Social media plays a critical role in natural disasters as an information propagator that can be 
leveraged for disaster responses. This study analyzed the online user engagement on social 
media during the 2016 Louisiana Flood through the lens of Social Network Analysis (SNA). Our 
findings revealed temporal and spatial characteristics of online social engagement as well 
as a trend of online users’ interests during the flood. We also identified how social capital/
infrastructure and community leaders were engaged in improving a flood inundation map. 
The results will assist emergency agencies and organizations to understand characteristics 
of social media and the user behaviors during disasters.
Introduction
Social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, play a vital role in disaster management 
by propagating emergency information to a disaster-affected community. Social media ranks 
as the fourth most popular source for accessing emergency information. Thus, emergency 
agencies need to understand characteristics of online social engagement and the network 
structure created by online user communications to expedite emergency information 
diffusion via their social media. The 2016 flood in Louisiana damaged more than 60,000 
homes and was the worst U.S. disaster after Hurricane Sandy in 2012. The no-name storm 
deposited about 7.1 trillion gallons of water on Louisiana comparing to Hurricane Katrina 
(2.3 trillion gallons) and Hurricane Isaac (5.3 trillion gallons). The major media has been 
criticized by many leaders in Louisiana for the lack of coverage of the 2016 Louisiana flood, 
especially compared to the other major natural disasters in the U.S. (Berman, 2016; May & 
Bowerman, 2016; Pallotta, 2016; Scott, 2016). During the period, the media mainly covered 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2016 Rio Summer Olympics. Craig Fugate, the 
administrator of the FEMA, stated: “You have Olympics, you got the election. If you look at 
the national news, you are probably on the third or fourth page. … We think it is a national 
headline disaster” (O’Donoghue, 2016). Parishes in Louisiana actively used their social media 
such as Twitter and Facebook to share information with the disaster-affected community – 
e.g., flood inundation map, locations of emergency shelters, medical services, and debris 
removal operation. This study investigated online user behaviors on Facebook in the city of 
Baton Rouge (CBR) during the 2016 Louisiana flood. We collected data from the Facebook 
page (facebook.com/cityofbatonrouge) during August 12 – December 1, 2016.
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Results
The CBR used both Twitter and Facebook to share emergency information. The number of 
engagement on Facebook was higher than Twitter during the flood. The trend of Facebook 
engagement significantly increased in the first two weeks, reached its peak on August 20, 
and then declined over time: 47% of the engagements were generated within the first two 
weeks. We measured online user centrality to determine the prominence or importance 
of users in the network. The degree distributions are very heterogeneous and highly right-
skewed (Kim & Hastak, 2018). That is, there were certain hubs in the network. The results 
revealed that individuals and agencies/organizations have different roles in the network. 
The individual users actively shared emergency information with their online friends by 
multiple activities such as tagging their friends, posting a comment, or sharing information 
with their online community: (1) like (76.56%), (2) comment (15.55%) and (3) share a (7.99%). 
In contrast, organizations/agencies played a critical role in connecting a network of the city 
of Baton Rouge with external social groups or online communities as a gatekeeper. Overall, 
the core of the online community consisted of numerous individuals, while agencies and 
organizations linked other communities.
Conclusions/Discussions
We compared search-term trends about the 2016 Louisiana flood and Hurricane Sandy of 
2012. There were summer Olympic Games and presidential elections around the time of 
both disasters, but the trends of online user interests were significantly different. People’s 
interest in the 2016 Louisiana flood was not significant and was lower than that shown for 
the summer Olympic Games and the presidential election, even though it was recorded 
as the worst disaster after Hurricane Sandy. Further investigations are needed to answer 
how these national events affect emergency information diffusion via social media and user 
behaviors during disaster responses.
We compared social engagement on Twitter and Facebook operated by CBR. Contrary 
to literature, disaster-related information was diffused actively via Facebook rather than 
Twitter during the flood (as of Oct 3 2018, 10,748 followers on Facebook and 16,500 followers 
on Twitter). There might be several reasons behind this. Firstly, Facebook has multiple 
functions for sharing numerous types of messages including images, videos, and hyperlinks. 
This flexibility of the platform might help users understand information faster and trigger 
them to share the information with others. Also, frequency of social media use might affect 
the difference of online engagement on Twitter and Facebook. Duggan (2015) identified that 
of Facebook’s total number of users, 70% visit the platform daily, while for Twitter this is 
38%. Thus, more people might a chance of being engaged in emergency information via 
Facebook.
Recently, Twitter doubled the text limit from 140 to 280 characters (Issac, 2017). It might 
affect Twitter user behaviors and patterns during disaster responses.
It is critical for the public to receive accurate, reliable and timely information from emergency 
agencies during disasters. As our findings reveal, SNA can be used to understand the 
heterogeneity of a large-scale social network and applied to accelerate information diffusion 
in emergency.  A structure of social network would be homogeneous, but the components 
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(vertices and edges) would be heterogeneous based on the built environment and human 
behaviors in a community. Thus, emergency agencies keep monitoring online social 
behaviors and engagement during multiple disasters and understand their characteristics 
in local-, state- and national level. Most questions could be answered by a multi-case study 
approach that would compare the use and effectiveness of social media across a broad 
range of disasters.
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Defensibility and Risk 
Management
Vicki Bier, Alexander Gutfraind, and Ziyang Lu
A common problem in risk management is to characterize the overall security of a system of 
valuable assets (e.g., government buildings or communication hubs), and to suggest measures 
to mitigate any security threats. Currently, analysts rely on a combination of security indices, 
such as resilience (the ability of a system to return to normal rapidly); robustness (the ability 
to function despite damage); redundancy (spare capacity); security (barriers to limit access); 
and vulnerability (susceptibility to hazards and/or intentional threats). However, these 
indices are not always actionable; i.e., they are not themselves sufficient to indicate whether 
policy makers should invest in improving a given system.  Indeed, it has been observed that 
some vulnerable systems cannot be improved cost-effectively [1].
Motivated by this gap, we recently proposed an index, defensibility [2], which characterizes 
how easily the damage to a system can be reduced. A system is highly defensible if a modest 
investment of resources can significantly reduce the damage from an attack or disruption 
(Fig. 1). Defensibility is defined in such a way that incommensurable systems can be compared 
to each other using a single measure.  The most defensible system would then receive the 
highest priority for defensive resources.
We compute the measure outlined above for several representative data sets, including 
property losses data from Willis [3] and air transportation data from the US Department of 
Transportation.  We also derive rigorous results for an important class of problems involving 
discrete assets of differing values, such as airports, military bases, or commercial buildings. 
Among our more surprising findings is that some types of systems may be more defensible 
against deliberate attackers than against random hazards.
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Fig. 1.  Hypothetical curves showing the residual values of three systems with different 
defensibilities.  and  are, respectively, the residual values of the system after an attack 
effort  in the case of zero defense effort and effort , respectively. The upper (concave) curve 
represents a highly defensible system, where a small defense effort results in a large increase 
in the residual value of the system.  Its defensibility at the point b is indicated by the vertical 
arrow between the upper curve V(a, b) and the dashed line V(a, 0).
To summarize, security analysis to date has been focused on existing notions such as 
vulnerability and resilience.  Our analysis here is based on the observation that some at-
risk systems may be much easier to improve than others. We argue that risk analysts and 
managers would benefit by considering defensibility in their risk management plans.
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